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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(a).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
I.

Whether the trial court correctiy awarded attorney's fees under Utah

Code Annotated § 78-27-56(1) by specifically finding that the
Defendants/Appellants James and Julie Lloyd (the "Lloyds") defense of the case
was without merit and asserted in bad faith.
Preservation of Issue: This issue was preserved in the trial court in
Plaintiffs/Appellees Andrew and Joan Gallegos' (the "Gallegos") Memorandum in
Support of their Motion for Attorney's Fees and Establishment of Costs, (R. at
288-290), and at the hearing on the Gallegos' Motion for Attorney's Fees and
Establishment of Costs. (R. at 397; Trans, of Ruling Only on 6/28/06 and
Motion on Attorney's Fees on 11/2/06, pp. 9-37.)1

1

For the Court's convenience, a true and correct copy of the oft: cited
Transcript of Ruling Only on 6/28/06 and Motion on Attorney's Fees on 11/2/06
is attached hereto as Addendum D. (R. 397.) The Gallegos will hereinafter cite to
the Transcript of Ruling Only on 6/28/06 and Motion on Attorney's Fees on
11/2/06 as Addendum D.
1

Standard of Review: The determination of whether a trial court's findings of
fact in support of an award of attorney's fees are legally sufficient is a question of
law reviewed for correctness. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah
1998). The question of whether the evidence adequately supports a trial court's
findings of fact which in turn sustain an award of attorney's fees is reviewed under
a clearly erroneous standard. Menzies v. Galitka, 2006 UT 81, 11 55, 150 P.3d
480. Likewise, a trial court's determination that an action was defended in bad
faith is a factual determination reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard.
Warner v. DMG Color, Inc., 2000 UT 102, 11 21, 20 P.3d 868.
II.

Whether the trial court correctly awarded attorney's fees as

consequential damages.
Preservation of Issue: This issue was preserved in the trial court in the
Gailegos' Memorandum in Support of their Motion for Attorney's Fees and
Establishment of Costs, (R. at 288-290), and at the hearing on the Gailegos'
Motion for Attorney's Fees and Establishment of Costs. (R. at 397; Addendum
D.)

2

Standard of Review: The determination of whether attorney's fees are
recoverable in an action is a question of law reviewed for correctness. Wcarce,
961P.2dat315.
PROVISIONS OF STATUTES AND RULES
The interpretation of Utah Code Annotated § 78-27-56(1) and Utah Rule of
Appellate Procedure 24(a)(9), are of importance to this appeal, copies of which are
attached hereto as Addenda A and B respectively
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings Below
This is a trespass case which arose from a situation where the Lloyds
constructed their home in such a fashion that it encroached approximately 38' on to
the Gallegos3 adjacent lot, thereby appropriating the superior views and topography
enjoyed by the Gallegos5 lot. The case was tried to Judge John Paul Kennedy on
June 27-28, 2006. The trial court ruled in favor of the Gallegos and entered
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Judgment and Decree on July 19,
2006. (R. at 305-319) ? Based on its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
2

For the Court's convenience, a true and correct copy of the trial court's oft
cited Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are attached hereto as Addendum
C. (R. 305-316.) The Gallegos will hereinafter cite to the trial court's Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law as Addendum C.
3

the trial court awarded the Gallegos their attorney's fees under Utah Code Ann. §
78-27-56(1) and as consequential damages to the Lloyds' trespass. (See id) The
amount of said fees was established by Rule 73 motion, and the trial court affirmed
its award of fees as well as the amount thereof in its Supplemental Judgment for
Attorney's Fees and Costs that was entered on November 15, 2006. (R. at 370372). This appeal followed.
Statement of Facts
This case arose when the Lloyds constructed a portion of their home and
related landscaping on a residential building lot owned by the Gallegos ("Lot 102")
in the Emigration Oaks Subdivision in Salt Lake County. (Addendum C at 11 13.)
After being confronted with the trespass by the Gallegos, the Lloyds failed to
initiate any action to address or otherwise resolve the boundary, tide and
expropriation issues created by their trespass. (Addendum C at 11 29.) As a result,
the Gallegos had no choice but to retain counsel and bring this action for trespass
and quiet tide against the Lloyds to resolve the boundary encroachment, adjust the
property boundaries, obtain recompense for the taking and otherwise render their
lot usable and marketable. (Id.)

4

Although the Lloyds correctiy assert that they did not contest their physical
encroachment onto Lot 102, they did contest the intentional element of the
Gallegos3 trespass claim. (Addendum C.)3 Indeed, the Lloyds3 defense to this
action was that they were unaware of their encroachment at the time they
constructed their home on a portion of Lot 102. (Id at HH 9 and 14.) In support
of their defense, the Lloyds testified that they were unaware that the construction
of their home was not proceeding according to their approved site plan, and that
they relied on other professionals to properly stake their home and notify them that
their home was not located according to the approved site plan. (Id.)
Following a two-day bench trial on June 27 and 28, 2006, the trial court
found that the Lloyds3 committed the intentional tort of trespass and awarded the
Gallegos damages. (See id) The trial court also awarded the Gallegos their
attorney's fees as consequential damages and/or under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.
(Id.) In awarding the Gallegos3 attorney's fees as consequential damages, the court
reasoned that as a direct consequence of the Lloyds3 trespass and subsequent failure

3

Unfortunately, the Gallegos are unable to cite to trial testimony because
the Lloyds failed to order a transcript of any trial testimony for purposes of this
appeal. (See R. at 393). Thus, the Gallegos cite to the trial court's Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law at Addendum C for the appropriate inferences of the
Lloyds3 defense and testimony at trial.
5

to do anything to address or resolve their trespass, the Gallegos were required to
obtain legal counsel and pursue this action in order to resolve the boundary
encroachment, adjust the lot boundaries, and render their lot usable and
marketable. (Addendum C at 11 29.)
The trial court supported its award of attorney's fees under § 78-27-56 with
detailed findings of fact. (Id at 29.) Specifically, the trial court found: (1) that
the Lloyds5 defense of the action was without merit (Id. at 11 29) because their
assertions that they were unaware that their home was constructed on the Gallegos3
property and that they relied on other professionals to ensure that they were
constructing their home in the proper location, were not credible (Id at 11 14); and
(2) the Lloyds5 failed to act in good faith in their defense of the action because they
lacked an honest belief in the propriety of their actions (Id at 11 29) in defending
the case by testifying falsely. (Id at 11 14). The court reached this conclusion by
finding that the physical markers and topography of the site were such that it was
essentially impossible for a sentient being to not realize that the house was being
built contrary to the official site plan approved by Salt Lake County. (Id at 11 15.)
Specifically, the court found:
There were several physical markers required by the Lot
106 Site Plan which never materialized during the

6

construction of the Lloyds5 home. These markers
included: 1) the presence of a 12 to 14 foot high
embankment on the west side of the Lloyd Home; 2) the
presence of two large retaining walls on both the west
and east side of the driveway; and 3) an average grade on
the driveway of 8.5% with a maximum grade of 10%.
The absence of these markers provided unmistakable
notice to the Lloyds that their home was being
constructed in the wrong location.
The Lloyds were negligent in going forward with the
construction of their home as staked because the Lloyds
knew; or should have known, that the staking and
subsequent construction of their home violated the
requirements of the Lot 106 Site Plan.
The Lloyds disregarded the requirements of the Lot 106
Site Plan to their considerable advantage.
Motive existed for the Lloyds to ignore the requirements
of the Lot 106 Site Plan. This motive included: 1)
avoiding increased excavation costs associated with the
excavation required by the Lot 106 Site Plan; 2) an
improved view with southern exposure; and 3)
constructing a relatively flat driveway rather than the
average 8.5% slope contemplated by the Lot 106 Site
Plan.
(Addendum C at 1HI 15-18.)
Subsequent to trial, during the hearing on the Gallegos3 Motion for
Attorney's Fees and Establishment of Costs on November 2, 2006, the trial court
affirmed its initial findings supporting its award of attorney's fees. (See Addendum
D; R. at 370-372.) Specifically in support of its award of attorney's fees under
7

§ 78-27-56, the court stated that cc[Mr. Lloyd's] conduct after litigation
commenced was also in bad faith as evidenced in part by the fact that he came to
court and testified, in my opinion, totally without credibility." (Addendum D at p.
35.) In support of its award of attorney's fees as consequential damages, the trial
court stated that
[i]t was entirely foreseeable that Mr. Lloyd's conduct
would necessitate at least some attorney's involvement
and as time went on it became more and more evident, it
seems to me, that there would be substantial attorney's
involvement, and I don't see a good faith effort on behalf
of the Lloyds to resolve the matter either earlier or even
now.
(Addendum D at 36).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

The trial court correcdy awarded attorney's fees under Utah Code

Ann. § 78-27-56. The trial court made specific factual findings following trial, and
during the hearing on the Gallegos' Motion for Attorney's Fees, that the Lloyds'
defense of the action was without merit and asserted in bad faith. In support of its
legal conclusion that the Lloyds' defense was without merit, the court made specific
factual findings that the Lloyds' testified totally without credibility in their defense.
In support of the court's factual finding of bad faith, the trial court made the
specific finding that the Lloyds lacked an honest belief in the propriety of their
8

actions in defending the case in part by testifying falsely at trial. The trial court's
legal conclusions are correcdy supported by its findings of fact. Further, the trial
court's findings concluding are well-supported in the evidence and are not clearly
erroneous. Foremost, Plaintiffs failed to marshal the evidence regarding the trial
court's findings of facts that the Lloyds' trial testimony was not credible. Indeed,
the Lloyds failed to order a transcript of the trial testimony in the case, let alone
present that testimony for this Court's consideration.
II.

The trial court correcdy awarded attorney's fees as consequential

damages. As a direct consequence of the Lloyds' trespass and their subsequent
failure to address or otherwise resolve their trespass, the Gallegos were required to
retain legal counsel and pursue this action in order to resolve the boundary
adjustment, adjust the lot boundaries, and render their lot useable and marketable.
This circumstance is not unlike the situation where tide to real property conveyed
by warranty deed is encumbered and the grantee has to incur fees to remove the
encumbrance and quiet tide. Utah courts have long allowed recovery of attorney's
fees in such a circumstance, reasoning that they—as in this case—constitute a
necessary cost incurred to render their property marketable and free from defects.

9

ARGUMENT
The instant appeal provides this Court with the unique opportunity to affirm
a trial court's well-reasoned award of attorney's fees correctly supported by specific
and undisputed findings of fact under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56(1) or as
consequential damages of the tort of trespass.
The Lloyds' attempted to defend this case by testifying that, despite the
significant and obvious deviations from their approved site plan, they were unaware
that the construction of their home was not proceeding according to the site plan
and/or that they relied on other professionals to notify them that they might be
building their home in the wrong place, namely, on the Gallegos' ideal flat, hilltop
property Not surprisingly, the trial court expressly found the facts to be
completely inconsistent with the Lloyds' testimony, and that the Lloyds knew or
should have known that they were building their home in the wrong place. As a
result, the court expressly found the Lloyds' testimony to be totally without
credibility
Based on these findings of fact, the trial court specifically found that the
Lloyds' defense of the case was without merit and asserted in bad faith, and
correctly awarded attorney's fees under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56(1).
Significantiy, in contesting the trial court's award of fees, the Lloyds failed to
10

marshal a scintilla of evidence to challenge the court's findings of fact upon which
its award is based. Accordingly this Court should summarily affirm the trial
court's findings of fact, and the award of attorney's fees correctiy supported by
those findings.
In addition, the trial court found that as a direct consequence of the Lloyds'
trespass and their subsequent failure to address or otherwise resolve their trespass,
the Gallegos were required to retain legal counsel and pursue this action in order to
render their property marketable. Although there is an absence of authority
awarding attorney's fees as consequential damages of the tort of trespass, this case
presents this Court with the ideal factual context in which to eliminate the
tort/contract distinction. This case is analogous to the situation where tide to real
property conveyed by warranty deed is encumbered and the grantee has to incur
fees to remove the encumbrance and quiet tide. Utah courts have routinely
allowed recovery of attorney's fees in this situation, reasoning that they—as the trial
court did in this case—constitute a necessary cost incurred to render their property
marketable and free from defects. Thus, this case presents this Court with the
unique opportunity to affirm the trial court's award attorney's fees as consequential
damages to the tort of trespass under a longstanding real property doctrine.

11

I.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY AWARDED ATTORNEY'S
FEES UNDER § 78-27-56 BY SPECIFICALLY FINDING THAT
THE LLOYDS5 DEFENSE WAS WITHOUT MERIT AND
ASSERTED IN BAD FAITH.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56(1) provides:
[i]n civil actions, the court shall award reasonable
attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court
determines that the action or defense to the action was
without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith...

Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56(1) (1988) (cc§ 78-27-56"). Section 78-27-56
establishes a two-part test to determine whether attorney's fees should be awarded
to a prevailing party in a civil action. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315
(Utah 1998). A trial court may award a prevailing party attorney's fees if it
determines that the defense to the action was (1) without merit, and (2) not
asserted in good faith. IdL Further, ccif the court finds both elements of the statute,
then it has no discretion and must award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing
party.55 Watkiss 8c Campbell v. Foa 8c Son, 808 P.2d 1061, 1068 (Utah 1991).
In the instant case, the trial court correctly awarded the Gallegos their
attorney's fees under § 78-27-56. The trial court supported its award of attorney's
fees by making specific and express findings that mirror the two-part test outiined
in § 78-27-56. (Addendum C at Hlf 14-29.) Indeed, the court specifically found
that the Lloyds5 defense of this action was (1) without merit, and (2) not asserted
12

in good faith. (Addendum C at 11 29.) The court further supported these findings
with specific findings of fact, notably that the Lloyds5 testimony in their defense
was not credible and that they lacked an honest belief in the propriety of their
actions in defending against the Gallegos3 claims. (Id at 1ffl 14 and 29.)
Accordingly this Court should affirm the trial court's award of attorney's fees
under §78-27-56(1).
A.

The Trial Court Correctly Determined that the Lloyds5 Defense
Was Asserted in Bad Faith.

It is largely a factual matter for the trial court to determine whether an
action was defended in bad faith and, thus, this determination is reviewed under a
clearly erroneous standard. Warner v. DMG Color, Inc., 2000 UT 102, If 21, 20
P. 3d 868. In addition, given the factual nature of a court's determination that an
action was defended in bad faith, a party challenging such a finding is required to
marshal the evidence under Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure. Wcarce, 961 P.2d at 315-316; Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9).
In challenging the trial court's finding that the Lloyds3 asserted their defense
in bad faith, the Lloyds3 attempt to convert the factual determination of bad faith
into a legal determination by arguing that the trial court misconstrued § 78-27-56
to exclusively punish the Lloyds3 pre-litigation conduct. (Lloyds3 Br. at 21-24.)

13

Specifically the Lloyds assert that "the trial court made no findings as to the
conduct of Lloyds within the litigation other than stating that it found Mr. Lloyd's
testimony "not credible." (Lloyds' Br. at 21-22.) The Lloyds' transparent attempt
to convert a well-established question of fact into a question of law—and avoid the
attendant burdens associated with challenging the trial court's findings of
fact—should be rejected.
1.

The Trial Court's Finding of Bad Faith is Based on the
Lloyds' Conduct During Litigation.

For purposes of § 78-27-56, a finding of a lack of good faith is synonymous
with a finding of bad faith. See Cady v. Tohnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151-152 (Utah
1983). In the instant case, the trial court found that:
the Lloyds failed to act in good faith in their defense of
this action. In particular, the Lloyds lacked an honest
belief in the propriety of their actions and, ultimately,
took advantage of Plaintiffs' property rights of which they
knew or should have known.
(Addendum C at U 29) (emphasis added). This clear and unambiguous language
reveals that the trial court specifically found that the Lloyds' asserted their defense
in bad faith. See Cady, 671 P.2d at 151-152. This finding is, without question,
based on the Lloyds' conduct during the litigation.

14

Further, as the Lloyds acknowledge, the trial court found that their
testimony—not just Mr. Lloyd's—was incredible. (Lloyds5 Br. at 21-22.) The
Lloyds3 defense to this action was that they were unaware of their encroachment at
the time they constructed their home on a portion of the Gallegos5 lot.4
(Addendum C at If IT 14-18.) In support of this defense, the Lloyds testified at trial
that they were unaware that the construction of their home was not proceeding
according to their approved site plan, and that they relied on other professionals to
properly stake their home and notify them that their home was not located
according to the approved site plan. (Id at 11 14.) The trial court, however,
specifically found:
[T]he Lloyd's assertion that they were unaware of the fact
that the construction of their home was not proceeding
according to the Lot 106 Site Plan and, hence, that they
were not aware of any potential encroachment onto Lot
102, is not credible. Likewise, the Lloyd's assertion that
they relied upon other professionals to properly stake
4

Interestingly, in their filings below, the Lloyds3 acknowledge they
committed the intentional tort of trespass upon "discovering" the trespass ccvery
early35 in the litigation. (R. at 270.) This assertion (Le,, that they admitted the
trespass) is contradicted by their own contention that they "discovered53 their
intentional tort some eight years after they had committed it, and their defense that
they were unaware that they were building their home in the wrong place, namely,
on the Gallegos3 property. Trespass is an intentional tort which means you know
what you were doing when you did it. One cannot logically admit to an
intentional tort and then concurrendy argue that they "discovered35 it eight years
later. The assertion is nonsensical.
15

their home or notify them that their home was not
located according to the Lot 106 Site Plan, is not
credible.
(Addendum C at 11 14.)
Although they obliquely acknowledge this finding, the Lloyds attempt to
dilute its import by arguing that cc[i]n virtually every litigation there will be a
requirement that the court find one version of the facts as given by one side more
credible than the other" and cc[t]hat this finding has never been held sufficient by
itself to uphold an award of attorneys [sic] fees under Section 78-27-56." (Lloyds'
Br. at 21-22.) The Lloyds fail to appreciate the difference between a trial court's
finding that one party's testimony is more credible than another, and a trial court's
finding that a partes testimony is not credible at all.
In the instant case, the trial court did not merely find that the Lloyds'
testimony was less credible than the Gallegos', it found that the Lloyds' testimony
was "not credible." (Addendum C at 11 14.) In other words, the trial court
determined that the Lloyds testified falsely in their defense. See Valcarce, 961 P.2d
at 315. Moreover, contrary to the Lloyds' assertion, Utah courts have long held
that a finding that a party has testified falsely in an attempt to avoid liability

16

compels the award of attorney's fees under § 78-27-56. See id; see also Topik v.
Thurber, 739 P.2d 1101, 1104 (Utah 1987).5
In addition, during the hearing on the Gallegos' Motion for Attorney's Fees,
counsel for the Lloyds asserted the very argument they present on appeal, namely,
that the trial court's finding of bad faith was based on the Lloyds3 pre-litigation
conduct, not their conduct in defending the case. (See Addendum D at pp. 9-37.)
In response to this argument, the trial court made clear that:
There are, at least, two bases for awarding fees in this
case. One is the statutory basis and I think that not only
was Mr. Lloyd's conduct before the litigation commenced
in bad faith, but I think his conduct after the litigation
commenced was also in bad faith as evidenced in part by
the fact that he came to court and testified, in my
opinion, totally without credibility . . . I did feel that the
evidence rose to a preponderance level and that would be
adequate in my opinion, given his post-commencement
of litigation conduct that I think would justify the award
of damages for bad faith in the litigation process.
So I feel that the bad faith is evidenced both before
and after the commencement of the litigation.
5

In Topik, the court's findings of bad faith and meritiess defense in support
of its award of attorney's fees under § 78-27-56 were both based on the party's
attempt to avoid liability by testifying falsely See Topik, 739 P.2d at 1104. This
reasoning is sound because if a party testifies falsely in her defense, there is
necessarily an absence of facts to support her defense, and the determination that
she testified falsely is evidence that she lacked an honest belief in the propriety of
her actions in testifying. (See §§ I. A. 3. through B. infra.) Indeed, parties
testifying falsely in their defense is ostensibly the precise conduct that § 78-27-56
was designed to punish.
17

(Addendum D at p. 35) (emphasis added). The court's findings both at trial and
during the hearing on the motion for attorney's fees negate the Lloyds3 assertion
that the trial court misconstrued § 78-27-56 to exclusively punish the Lloyds3 prelitigation conduct.
Given the trial court's express findings of fact that the Lloyds asserted their
defense in bad faith and that they testified falsely in their defense, the remaining
seminal question is whether these factual determinations are clearly erroneous. See
Warner, 2000 UT 102 at U 21. The Lloyds3 failure to meet their burden to order a
transcript and marshal the evidence to protest these findings of fact, however,
renders the answer to this question academic.
2.

The Lloyds5 Failure to Marshal the Evidence Compels
Affirming the Trial Court's Finding that They Asserted
Their Defense in Bad Faith.

When challenging a finding of fact, this Court will generally not address the
challenge unless the appellant has properly "marshaled the evidence.33 Utah R.
App. P. 24(a)(9); United Park City Mines Co. v Stichting Mayflower Mountain
Fonds, 2006 UT 35, 1f 24, 140 P3d 1200; State v. Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60, K 13,
983 P2d 556; Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 433-34 (Utah 1998). Specifically,
in order to adequately challenge a finding of fact, the challenging party must
"marshal all the supporting evidence and demonstrate its insufficiency33 Utah Dept.
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of Social Services v. Adams. 806 P.2d 1193, 1197 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (citation
omitted) (emphasis original). The marshaling requirement "serves the important
function of reminding litigants and appellate courts of the broad deference owed to
the fact finder at trial.55 Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P2d 474, 477 (Utah Ct. App.
1991); accord State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 739 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Further,
marshaling "provides the appellate court the basis from which to conduct a
meaningful and expedient review of facts challenged on appeal." Robb v.
Anderton, 863 P.2d 1322, 1328 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
The "insistence on compliance with the marshaling requirement is not a case
of exalting hypertechnical adherence to form over substance." State v. Larsen, 828
P.2d 487, 491 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), affd, 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993).

CC

[AJ

reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority
cited and is not simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump the
burden of argument and research." IcL Further, when a party fails to perform the
critical task of marshaling the evidence, tins Court cccan rely on that failure to affirm
the lower court's findings of fact." United Park City Mines Co., 2006 UT 35 at 11
27.
The trial court's finding that the Lloyds asserted their defense in bad faith is
a factual determination by the court which invokes the marshaling requirement.
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Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 315-316; Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). The Lloyds utterly
failed, however, to marshal a scintilla—let alone all—of the evidence supporting the
trial court's determination that they asserted their defense in bad faith. (See Lloyds'
Br. at § II.) In addition, although the Lloyds' acknowledge that the trial court
found their testimony to be incredible (Id at 21-22), they failed to even order a
transcript of the testimony presented at trial—the very evidence on which the
court's finding of bad faith is based. (R. at 393.)6 Consequently, with no
transcript before it, this court is bound to presume that the findings are supported
by adequate, competent evidence. Smith v. Vuicich, 699 P.2d 763, 765 (Utah
1985); Sampson v. Richins, 770 P2d 998, 1002 (UT App. 1989).
The Lloyds have failed to properly marshal any, let alone all, of the evidence
supporting the trial court's finding of bad faith, or the underlying findings of fact
that they lacked an honest belief in the propriety of their actions in defending the
case by testifying falsely at trial. Accordingly, this Court should summarily affirm
the trial court's finding of bad faith. See United Park City Mines Co., 2006 UT 35

6

Indeed, a review of the Lloyds' Request for Transcript reveals that the
Lloyds limited their request to only a portion of the trial court's ruling following
trial, and the hearing on the Gallegos' Motion for Attorney's Fees and
Establishment of Costs. (See R. at 393).
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at U 27; Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 312; Benvenuto. 1999 UT at 11 13; Young v.
Young, 979 P.2d 338, 345 (Utah 1999).
3.

The Trial Court's Finding of Bad Faith is Well-Supported
in the Record and is Not Clearly Erroneous.

To find that a party acted in bad faith, the trial court must find that one or
more of the following factors existed: (1) the party lacked an honest belief in the
propriety of their actions; (2) the party intended to take unconscionable advantage
of others; or (3) the party intended to or acted with the knowledge that the
activities in question would hinder, delay or defraud others. Valcarce, 961 P.2d at
316; citing Cady, 671 P.2d at 151.
In addition to its findings that the Lloyds3 testimony was not credible, the
trial court made express findings supporting its finding of bad faith. (See
Addendum C at 111114-18 and 29). Specifically, the trial court found that:
the Lloyds failed to act in good faith in their defense of
this action. In particular, the Lloyds lacked an honest
belief in the propriety of their actions and, ultimately,
took advantage of Plaintiffs5 property rights of which they
knew or should have known.
(Id. at 11 29) (emphasis added). This plain language reveals that the trial court
expressly found at least one of the Cady factors, namely, that the Lloyds lacked an
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honest belief in the propriety of their actions in defending this case. See Cady, 671
P.2d at 151. The court's finding of bad faith is supported by this finding alone.7
In addition, the trial court made further findings supporting its finding that
the Lloyds lacked an honest belief in the propriety of their testimony (See
Addendum C at 1TO 14-18). Specifically, that the Lloyds knew that they were
testifying falsely in their defense. In this regard, the trial court found:
[t]he Lloyds were negligent in going forward with the
construction of their home as staked because the Lloyds
knew, or should have known, that the staking and
subsequent construction of their home violated the
requirements of the Lot 106 Site Plan.
The Lloyds disregarded the requirements of the Lot 106
Site Plan to their considerable advantage.
Motive existed for the Lloyds to ignore the requirements
of the Lot 106 Site Plan. This motive included: 1)
avoiding increased excavation costs associated with the
excavation required by the Lot 106 Site Plan; 2) an
improved view with southern exposure; and 3)
constructing a relatively flat driveway rather than the

7

As with the trial court's findings of fact that the Lloyds asserted their
defense in bad faith and that they testified falsely in their defense, the Lloyds failed
to marshal the evidence to challenge the trial court's finding of fact that they lacked
an honest belief in the propriety of their actions in defending the case. (See
Lloyds3 Br.) Thus, this Court should affirm the trial court's finding of this Cady
indicator of bad faith. See United Park City Mines Co., 2006 UT 35 at II 27;
Vakarce, 961 P2d at 312; Benvenuto, 1999 UT at 11 13; Young v. Young, 979
P.2d338, 345 (Utah 1999).
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average 8.5% slope contemplated by the Lot 106 Site
Plan.
(Addendum C at 1111 16-18) (emphasis added). These findings, coupled with the
court's findings that the Lloyds testified falsely in their defense and, hence, lacked
an honest belief in the propriety of their actions in defending the case,
demonstrates that the trial court's finding of bad faith is well supported in the
record and not clearly erroneous.
J

\

ihe Trial Court Correctly Determined that the Lloyd's Defense
was Without Merit.
1.

The Lloyds3 Defense is Void of Any Basis in Fact.

A defense is without merit for purposes of § 78-27-56 if it is "of litde
weight or importance having no basis in law or fact." Warner v. DMG Color, Inc.,
2000 UT 102, 1f 22, 20 P.3d 868 (citing Cady, 671 P.2d at 151) (emphasis
added). The trial court correcdy concluded that the Lloyds' defense was without
merit because it is void of any basis in fact.
The Lloyds' defense to this action was that they were unaware of their
encroachment at the time they constructed their home on a portion of the Galiegos'
lot because they were unaware that the construction of their home was not
proceeding according to the site plan approved by Salt Lake County (Addendum
C at If 14.) After hearing the testimony and considering the evidence presented at
23

trial, the trial court found that the physical markers and topography of the Lloyds5
building site were such that it was essentially impossible for a sentient being to not
realize that the house was being built contrary to the official site plan approved by
Salt Lake County. (Addendum C at H1f 15-18.) Specifically the court found:
[t]here were several physical markers required by the Lot
106 Site Plan which never materialized during the
construction of the Lloyd's home. These markers
included: 1) the presence of a 12 to 14 foot high
embankment on the west side of the Lloyd Home; 2) the
presence of two large retaining walls on both the west
and east side of the driveway; and 3) an average grade on
the driveway of 8.5% with a maximum grade of 10%.
The absence of these markers provided unmistakable
notice to the Lloyd's that their home was being
constructed in the wrong location.
(Addendum C at 11 15) (emphasis added). In other words, there is absolutely no
basis in fact for the Lloyds3 defense that they were unaware that the construction of
their house was not proceeding in the correct location as defined by the Salt Lake
County approved site plan.8 Accordingly the trial court correctly determined that
the Lloyds5 defense of this action was without merit because it was void of any
basis in fact. Warner, 2000 UT 102 at 1f 22. Indeed, the absence of facts in

8

In their brief, the Lloyds assert that their "defenses were based on facts in
the record.53 (Lloyds5 Br. at 18.) The Lloyds, however, fail to cite to any facts in
the record in support their defense. (See Lloyds5 Br.) This failure is telling of the
lack of any factual basis in the record for the Lloyds5 defense of this action.
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support of their defense necessarily required the Lloyds to testify falsely in order to
fabricate a defense.
2.

The Lloyds Testified Falsely i

)efense.

Testifying falsely ccis not a legitimate mode of defense35 and supports a
finding that a defense is without merit. Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 315. Indeed, the
Utah Supreme Court has made clear that cca finding that a party has attempted to
avoid liability by testifying falsely will support a decision to award attorney fees if
combined with a finding of bad faith.55 I d (citing Topik, 739 E2d at 1104).
In Valcarce, the counter claim plaintiff alleged that the counterclaim
defendant, Mr. Valcarce, damaged an irrigation canal and a series of damming
devices on the canal. Id at 310. In response, Mr. Valcarce testified at trial that he
did not damage the irrigation canal or its dams. Id The trial court, however,
"found his testimony to be incredible5 and concluded that Paul Valcarce did indeed
damage the canal.55 I d Based on this finding, the Supreme Court concluded that
the trial court correcdy determined that Mr. Valcarce5s defense of the case was
without merit, hL; see also Topik, 739 P.2d at 1104 (holding trial court correcdy
awarded attorneys fees under § 78-27-56 because the defendant attempted to avoid
liability by testifying falsely).
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In the instant case, the trial court correcdy determined that the Lloyds3
defense of the case was without merit because the court specifically found—as in
Valcarce—that the Lloyds3 testimony in support of their defense was incredible.
(Addendum C at 11 14.) In support of their defense, the Lloyds testified that they
were unaware that the construction of their home was not proceeding according to
their approved site plan, and that they relied on other professionals to properly
stake their home and notify them that their home was not located according to the
approved site plan. (Addendum C at II 14.)
The trial court, however, specifically found:
[t]he Lloyd's assertion that they were unaware of the fact
that the construction of their home was not proceeding
according to the Lot 106 Site Plan and, hence, that they
were not aware of any potential encroachment onto Lot
102, is not credible. Likewise, the Lloyd's assertion that
they relied upon other professionals to properly stake
their home or notify them that their home was not
located according to the Lot 106 Site Plan, is not
credible.
(Id.) (emphasis added). The trial court further found during the hearing on the
Gallegos' Motion for Attorney's Fees that Mr. Lloyd came into court "and testified,
in my opinion, totally without credibility." (Addendum D at p. 35) (emphasis
added). Thus, under Valcarce, the trial court correctiy determined that the Lloyds'
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defense was without merit because they attempted to avoid liability by testifying
falsely9 See Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 315.
The Lloyds contend that their defense cannot be deemed without merit
because the "trial court reduced the amount of actual damages claimed by Gallegos
by more than forty percent and completely dismissed the Gallegos3 claim for
punitive damages." (Lloyd's Br. at 18.) In support of this contention, the Lloyds
rely heavily on MiVida Enterprises v. Steen-Adams, et al., 2005 UT App 400, 122
P.3d 144. This reliance, however, is misplaced.
In MiVida, this court reversed the award of attorney's fees under § 78-27-56
because there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of bad faith to satisfy
the second prong of the statutory test. Id. at 11 IX. hi reaching tins conclusion, the
Court specifically noted that cc[b]ecause we determine that bad faith was lacking in
this case, we need not address whether the Colorado action was without merit."
IdL at 11 18, n. 7. Thus, the case hardly stands for the proposition that a reduction
in damages claims negates a trial court's finding of a meritiess defense under § 7827-56, because the Court never addressed the issue.

9

Although the Lloyds failed to challenge the trial .court's finding that they
testified falsely in their defense, even if they had, as established in § I. A. 2. supra,
the Lloyds failed to meet their burden to marshal the evidence in support of such a
challenge. See § I. A. 2. supra.
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Instead of referring to an analysis under § 78-27-56, the Lloyds5 reliance on
MiVida centers on a strained reading of the Court's ruling under Rule 33 of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Specifically the Lloyds3 attempt to equate a
trial court's finding of a merkless defense under § 78-27-56 with a determination
of whether an appeal is frivolous under Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure. (Lloyd's Br. at 19.) The Lloyds, however, fail to cite to any authority,
from Utah or elsewhere, that supports the proposition that a determination that a
defense is without merit under § 78-27-56 is analogous to a determination that an
appeal is frivolous under Rule 33; no such authority exists. (See Lloyds' Br. at
§11.)
Indeed, the applicable authority in Utah regarding the award of attorney's
fees under § 78-27-56 stands for the exact opposite proposition: although a
defendant may prevail on some claims, this success does not negate a trail court's
finding that the defense was without merit under § 78-27-56. In Coalville City v.
Lundgren. 930 P.2d 1206, 1211 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), this Court specifically held
that the cc[d]efendant's measure of success on a collateral issue does not preclude an
assessment of bad faith attorney fees" under § 78-27-56; see also Topik, 739 P.2d
at 1104 (upholding attorney fees award under § 78-27-56 against defendant where
"defense was partially in bad faith" because defendant testified falsely about one of
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several defenses). This Court's holding in Coalville City is also in accord with
other jurisdictions5 holdings under similar statutes. See e ^ 5 Wean Water, Inc. v.
Sta-Rite Indus., Inc.. 686 P.2d 1285, 1287 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984) (upholding
attorney's fees award under similar bad faith statute where plaintiffs technical
success on breach of contract claim did not negate groundless fraud claim made in
bad faith).
In summary, the trial court held that the Lloyds5 defense of the case was
without merit because the Lloyds took the stand and testified falsely in an effort to
convince the trial court that construction of their home on the Gallegos5 lot was an
innocent mistake resulting from the conduct of a deceased, hapless and underpaid
surveyor. The trial court specifically found this testimony totally incredible, and the
attempt to claim ignorance and blame others, without merit. In addition, the
Lloyds did not even attempt to challenge the trial court5s findings of fact which
directly support its conclusion that the Lloyds5 defense of the case was without
merit. Thus, under Valcarce, the trial court's determination that the Lloyds5
defense was without merit follows a fortiori from its finding of fact that their
testimony was not credible.
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II.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY AWARDED ATTORNEY'S
FEES AS CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES.
The Gallegos are well aware of the limitations of Utah law regarding

recovery of attorneys fees as damage in tort cases. It is for this reason that counsel
suggested the alternative statutory basis to support the award at the time the trial
court was issuing its ruling. (Addendum D at p. 7.) Nevertheless, this case
presents a compelling circumstance for allowing recovery of fees as an element of
damage because without initiation and prosecution of this action, the Gallegos3
property would have remained wholly unmarketable indefinitely (Addendum C at
1I1f 24 and 27.)
As the trial court found, "the Lloyds initiated no action to address or resolve
their trespass." (Id. at 11 29.) The trial court further found that:
[a]s a direct consequence of the actions and/or omissions
of the Lloyds, the Gallegos were required to obtain
counsel and pursue this action in order to resolve the
boundary encroachment, adjust the lot boundaries, and
render Lot 102 usable and marketable.

(14)
This circumstance is not unlike the situation where title to real property
conveyed by warranty deed is encumbered and the grantee has to incur fees to
remove the encumbrance and quiet tide. Utah courts have long allowed recovery
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of attorneys fees in such a circumstance, reasoning that they constitute a necessary
cost incurred to render their property marketable and free from defects. Van Cott
v. Tacklin, 63 Utah 412, 422, 236 P. 460, 463-64 (1924); Creason v. Peterson, 24
Utah 2d 305, 470 P.2d 403 (1970); Holmes Dev. Co., LLC v. Cook. 2002 UT
38,1139, 48P.3d895.
From a logical standpoint, it is difficult to rationalize allowing an award in
the deed context and deny that same award where the damage is real and
comparable in both instances and the only difference is the hoary dichotomy of tort
vs. contract. This case is an appropriate vehicle for the court to move beyond the
tort/contract distinction and allow recovery of fees where the defendants5 conduct
requires the expenditure of fees to remedy a title problem which renders plaintiffs5
real property unmarketable.
The Gallegos request their attorney's fa % and costs associated with the
instant appeal.
It is well-established that ccwhen a party who received attorney fees below
prevails on appeal, the party is also entitied to fees reasonably incurred on appeal.55
Pearson v. Lamb: 2005 UT App 383, 11 15, 121 P.3d 717; see also Vakarce, 961
P.2d at 319; Utah Dept. of Social Services, 806 P.2d at 1197. "Moreover, an
appeal brought from an action which is properly determined to be in bad taith is
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necessarily frivolous under Utah R. App. P. 33." Utah Dept. of Social Services,
806P.2datll97.
In the instant case, the trial court correctly awarded attorney's fees under
§ 78-27-56 and as consequential damages of the Lloyds5 trespass. In addition, in
support of its award of fees under § 78-27-56, the trial court properly determined
that the Lloyds acted in bad faith in their defense of this action. (See Addendum C
at 11 29). Indeed, the Lloyds wholly failed to properly challenge the finding of bad
faith, or the findings of fact upon which the bad faith determination was premised.
(See Lloyds5 Br. at § II). Accordingly, the Gallegos hereby request their attorney's
fees and costs associated with the instant appeal pursuant to Rule 24(a)(9) of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
CONCLUSION
This case presents the "poster child55 for a § 78-27-56 award of fees. When
people come into our courts and testify falsely, our system of jurisprudence is
threatened and sometimes malfunctions. The Gallegos believe that the sound
public policy behind § 78-27-56 is a desire by the legislature to discourage and
indeed punish those who enter its courts on the premise of false testimony and
meritless action.
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The Lloyds expropriated for their own benefit, the prime topographic feature
of the Gallegos5 lot, came to court and lied about it, and then quibbled over the
damages and fees the Gallegos were required to incur in order to attempt to
remedy the Lloyds3 intentional trespass. Sound public policy and fundamental
fairness dictate that the judgment below be affirmed in all respects and that the
Gallegos be awarded their fees on appeal.
Respectfully submitted this <X~. day of July 2007.
WILLIAMS & HUNT

135374.1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the <)— day of July, 2007,1 caused two (2) true and
correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS/APPELLEES
ANDREW AND JOAN GALLEGOS to be mailed postage prepaid thereon, by
first class mail in the United States mail, to the following:
T. Richard Davis, Esq.
CALLISTER, NEBEKER & MCCULLOUGH

Gateway Tower East, Suite 900
10 East South Temple Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 8413a
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Tab A

ADDENDUM A
I

:i Code Ann. § 78-27-56(1)

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

78-27-56

78-27-56. Attorney's fees — Award where action in i
fense in bad faith — Exceptions.
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a
prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to the action
was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith, except under
Subsection (2).
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a
party under Subsection (1), but only if the court:
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in the action
before the court; or
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees under
the provisions of Subsection (1).
History: L. 1981, ch. 13, § 1; 1988, ch. 92,
§ 1.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
between those fees incurred in connection with
successful and unsuccessful claims, as must the
evidence submitted by the prevailing party, or
the reviewing court will be precluded from
making an independent determination. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305 (Utah 1998).

ANALYSIS

Appeal.
—Frivolous appeal.
Award.
—Distinguishing between fees.
Discretion of court.
Essential elements.
Fees properly awarded.
Fees properly denied.
Findings.
Good faith by insurer.
Hearing.
Paralegal services.
Quiet title action.
- State of mind.
"Without merit" and "good faith/'
—Bad faith not found.
Cited.
Appeal.
The "without merit" determination is a question of law, and therefore the appellate court
will review it for correctness. Jeschke v. Willis,
811 P.2d 202 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
A finding of bad faith is a question of fact and
is reviewed by the appellate court under the
"clearly erroneous" standard. Jeschke v. Willis,
811 P.2d 202 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
—Frivolous appeal.
An appeal brought from an action which is
properly determined to be in bad faith is necessarily frivolous under Utah R. App. P. 33.
Utah Dep't of Social Servs. v. Adams, 806 P.2d
1193 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Award.
—Distinguishing between fees.
An award of attorney fees must distinguish

Discretion of court.
It is within the trial court's discretion to
determine bad faith under this section. Canyon
Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414 (Utah
1989).
An award of attorney fees premised on a
finding of bad faith is, to an extent, a matter
within the discretion of the trial court, and
appellate deference is owed to the trial judge
who actually presided over the proceeding and
has first-hand famiharity with the litigation.
Utah Dep't of Social Servs. v. Adams, 806 P.2d
1193 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Essential elements.
This section clearly states that the court
shall award attorney fees to the prevailing
party only if it determines (1) that the action is
without merit and (2) that the action was
brought in bad faith. If the court finds both
elements of the statute, then it has no discretion and must award reasonable attorney fees
to the prevailing party. Watkiss & Campbell v.
Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1991).
Three requirements must be met before the
court shall award attorney fees: (1) the party
must prevail, (2) the claim asserted by the
opposing party must have been without merit,
and (3) the claim must not have been brought
or asserted in good faith. Hermes Assocs. v.
Park's Sportsman, 813 P.2d 1221 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991). ,
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78-27-56

JUDICIAL CODE

Fees properly awarded.
Where defendant's pattern of ignoring court
orders caused plaintiff to take legal action on
several occasions to force defendant's compliance, plaintiff was properly awarded attorney
fees. Coalville City v. Lundgren, 930 P.2d 1206
(Utah Ct. App. 1997), cert, denied, 939 P.2d 683
(Utah 1997).
Trial court did not err in awarding attorney
fees based on findings that plaintiffs' claims
and defenses were without merit because the
facts were contrary to evidence and bad faith
was shown by plaintiffs' pursuit of claims having no other apparent reason than to harass
defendants and drive up the costs of litigation.
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305 (Utah
1998).
An award of attorney fees was appropriate
where plaintiff's action in the trial court had no
basis in law, and thus was without merit.
Warner v. DMG Color, Inc., 2000 UT 102, 20
R3d 868.
Fees properly denied.
Because, absent a voluntary agreement between the disputing parties, a quiet title action
is the only legally binding way to settle a
boundary dispute and because it could not be
said that landowner acted in bad faith by
refusing to sign quitclaim deed sent by attorney
retained by adjacent land owners until after
the adjacent landowners had filed suit, trial
court's denial of adjacent landowners' claim for
attorney fees under this section was proper.
Chipman v. Miller, 934 P.2d 1158 (Utah Ct. App.
1997).
Defendant's request for attorney fees was
denied where plaintiff's claims were not shown
to be without merit and not brought in bad
faith, and defendants failed to marshal the
evidence regarding bad faith. Wardley Better
Homes & Garden v. Cannon, 2001 UT App 48,
21 P.3d 235.
Findings.
Under this section, a trial court must make
findings that: (1) the claim or claims were
"without merit," and (2) the party did not act in
good faith. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768
R2d 950 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
This section does not require written findings
on the bad faith issue. If a court finds bad faith
but in its discretion limits or awards no attorney fees, Subsection (2)(b) does, however, require written findings. Canyon Country Store v.
Bracey, 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989).
Good faith by insurer.
Proof of a breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing by an insurer does not show
the bad faith necessary for an award under this
section. Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781
P.2d 414 (Utah 1989).
An insurer is obliged to assess the black-

letter law in the jurisdiction in which the claim
arises; this obligation to properly assess the
law extends to the legal assertions a party and
its counsel may make in litigation. Lieber v.
ITT Hartford Ins. Ctr, Inc., 2000 UT 90, 15
P.3d 1030.
Hearing.
This section does not require a trial court to
hold a hearing to determine if a party has been
"stubbornly litigious" or if an action was without merit. Canyon County Store v. Bracey, 781
P.2d 414 (Utah 1989).
Paralegal services.
Services provided by a paralegal were properly included in the court's award of attorney's
fees. Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d 1188 (Utah
1993).
Quiet title action.
Although ruling was made that attorney fees
are not recoverable in an undisputed quiet title
action, award of attorney fees to landowners,
pursuant to their counterclaim against adjacent landowners on the basis that the adjacent
landowners acted in bad faith by pursuing a
second cause of action for attorney fees after
obtaining a quitclaim deed from landowner for
the disputed property, could not be supported
under either Subsection (1) of this section or
Utah R. Civ. P. 11, because when adjacent
landowners filed their claim there was no clear
prohibition on the recovery of attorney fees in
undisputed quiet title actions and finding was
not made as to bad faith on part of the adjacent
landowner. Chipman v. Miller, 934 P.2d 1158
(Utah Ct. App. 1997).
State of mind.
The existence of bad faith, which must be
shown under this section, is a subjective question of state of mind. Canyon County Store v.
Bracey, 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989).
"Without merit" and "good faith."
A frivolous action having no basis in law or
fact is "without merit," but is nevertheless in
"good faith" as long as there is an honest belief
that it is appropriate, and as long as there is no
intent to hinder, delay, defraud or take advantage of another. Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149
(Utah 1983).
To prove that a claim is "without merit," the
party asserting an award of attorney fees must
first demonstrate that the claim is "frivolous" or
"of little weight or importance having no basis
in law or fact." Second, the party must prove
that the plaintiff's conduct in bringing the suit
was lacking in good faith. Jeschke v. Willis, 811
P.2d 202 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
There was no remand, even assuming that
defendants had asserted their defense in bad
faith, when nothing in the record supported a
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conclusion that the defense was without merit.
Broadwater v. Old Republic Sur., 854 R2d 527
(Utah 1993).
The point at which plaintiff should have
mitigated her damages is a legitimate issue
that can hardly be characterized as frivolous or
as having no basis in law or fact. Broadwater v.
Old Republic Sur., 854 R2d 527 (Utah 1993).
—Bad faith not found.
County's condemnation of the plaintiff's
property in two separate legal actions, when
the subject property was always within the
scope of the original plans to build a county
airport, was not done in bad faith. Board of
County Comm'rs v. Ferrebee, 844 P.2d 308
(Utah 1992).
Respondent was not entitled to attorney fees
on appeal where the trial court specifically
found that the petitioner brought her action for
modification of a divorce decree believing that
she was legally entitled to some of the respondent's military retirement benefits, and the
respondent did not challenge those findings.
Childs v. Callahan, 993 P.2d 244 (Utah Ct. App.
1999).
Plaintiff's claim for attorney fees failed under
this section because defendant offered no defense, so the court could not determine that the
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defense to the action was without merit. Faust
v. Kai Techs., Inc., 2000 UT 82, 15 P.3d 1266.
It was not bad faith for town residents to seek
judicial review after having failed in their administrative challenge to a zoning ordinance;
thus, an award of attorney fees was improper.
Hatch v. Boulder Town Council, 2001 UT App
55, 21 P.3d 245.
Because the trial court's grant of attorney
fees was based on its finding that a claim had
been pursued in bad faith, when that claim was
later found to have merit, the grant of attorney
fees w'as also reversed. Sittner v. Schriever,
2001 UT App 99, 22 R3d 784.
Cited in Topik v. Thurber, 739 P.2d 1101
(Utah 1987); Hatanaka v. Struhs, 738 P.2d 1052
(Utah Ct. App. 1987); O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P2d
306 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); DeBry v. Occidental/Nebraska Fed. Sav. Bank, 754 P.2d 60 (Utah
1988); Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 R2d 163
(Utah Ct. App. 1989); Cascade''Energy & Metals
Corp. v. Banks, 896 F.2d 1557 (10th Cir. 1990);
Burns Chiropractic Clinic v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
851 P2d 1209 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Pennington
v. Allstate Ins. Co, 973 R2d 932 (Utah 1998);
Ault v. Holden, 2002 UT 33,44 P.3d 781; Rohan
v. Boseman, 2002 UT App 109,^46 P.3d 753.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Attorney's Fees in
Utah, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 553.
Attorney's Fees in Bad Faith, Meritless Actions, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 593.
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Legislative Enactments — Attorney's Fees, 1989
Utah L. Rev. 342.
Note, "The Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress: A New Cause of Action in Utah," 1989
Utah L. Rev. 571.
A.L.R. — Construction and application of
state statute or rule subjecting party making
untrue allegations or denials*to payment of

costs or attorneys' fees, 68 A L.R.3d 209.
Attorneys' fees as recoverable in fraud action,
44A.L.R.4th776.
Attorneys' fees: obduracy as basis for statecourt award, 49 A.L.R.4th 825.
Attorney's liability under state law for opposing party's counsel fees, 56 A.L.R.4th 486.
Recovery of attorneys' fees and costs of litigation incurred as result of breach of agreement
not to sue, 9 A.L.R.5th 933.
^
Award of counsel fees to prevailing party
based on adversary's bad faith, obduracy, or
other misconduct, 31 A.L.R. Fed. 833.

78-27-56.5. Attorney's fees
attorney's fees.

Reciprocal rights to recover

A court may award costs and attorneys fees to either party that prevails in
a civil action based upon any promissory note, written contract, or other
writing executed after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the promissory
note, written contract, or other writing allow at least one party to recover
attorney's fees.
History: C. 1953,78-27-56.5, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 79, § 1.
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Cited in State v. Classon, 935 R2d 524 (Utah
Ct App. 1997), cert granted, 945 P2d 1118
(Utah 1997); State v. Bredehoft, 966 P2d 285
Utah Ct. App. 1998), cert, denied, 982 P2d 88

(Utah 1999), State v. Simmons, 2000 U T App
190, 398 Utah Adv. Rep. 7; State v. Mecham,
2000 UT App 247, 9 P.3d 777.

Rule 24. Briefs.
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under
appropriate headings and in the order indicated:
(a)(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency
whose judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of
the case on appeal contains the names of all such parties. The list should be set
out on a separate page which appears immediately inside the cover.
(a)(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page
references.
(a)(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with
parallel citations, rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with references to
the pages of the brief where they are cited.
(a)(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court.
(a)(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each
issue: the standard of appellate review with supporting authority; and
(a)(5)(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the
trial court; or
\
(a)(5)(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved
in the trial court.
(a)(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations
whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to
the appeal shall be set out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the
pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the
provision shall be set forth in an addendum to the brief under paragraph (11)
of this rule/
*
t
(a)(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the
nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court
below. A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review shall
follow. All statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be
supported by citations to the record in accordance with paragraph (e) of this
rule.
(a)(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably
paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of the arguments actually made
in the body of the brief. It shall not be a mere repetition of the heading under
which the argument is arranged.
(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and
reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the
grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court,'with citations
to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. A party
challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports
the challenged finding. A party seeking to recover attorney's fees incurred on
appeal shall state the request explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such
an award.
(a)(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought.
(a)(ll) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is
necessary under this paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as part of the
brief unless doing so makes the brief unreasonably thick. If the addendum is
bound separately, the*-'addendum shall contain a table of contents. The
addendum shall contain a copy of:
(a)(ll)(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central
importance cited in the brief but not reproduced verbatim in the brief;
(a)(ll)(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of
Appeals opinion; in all cases any court opinion of central importance to the
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appeal but not available to the court as part of a regularly published reporter
service; and
(a)(ll)(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance
to the determination of the appeal, such as the challenged instructions,
findings of fact and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of
the court's oral decision, or the contract or document subject to construction.
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the
requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule, except that the appellee need not
include:
(b)(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is
dissatisfied with the statement of the appellant; or
(b)(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum of the appellant. The appellee may refer to the addendum of the
appellant.
(c) Reply brief The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the
appellee, and if the appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief in
reply to the response of the appellant to the issues presented by the crossappeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in
the opposing brief. The content of the reply brief shall conform to the
requirements of paragraphs (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule. No further
briefs may be filed except with leave of the appellate court.
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their briefs
and oral arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such
designations as "appellant" and "appellee." It promotes clarity to use the
designations used in the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the actual
names, of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee," "the injured
person," "the taxpayer," etc.
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages
of the original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 1Kb) or to pages of any
statement of the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared
pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). References to pages of published depositions or
transcripts shall identify the sequential number of the cover page of each
volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom right corner and each separately
numbered page(s) referred to within the deposition or transcript as marked by
the transcriber. References to exhibits shall be made to the exhibit numbers. If
reference is made to evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy,
reference shall be made to the pages of the record at which the evidence was
identified, offered, and received or rejected.
,(f) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs shall
not exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of
pages containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum
containing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as required by
paragraph (a) of this rule. In cases involving cross-appeals, paragraph (g) of
this rule sets forth the length of briefs.
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the party
first filing a notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant, unless the parties
otherwise agree or the court otherwise orders. Each party shall be entitled to
file two briefs. No brief shall exceed 50 pages, and no party's briefs shall in
combination exceed 75 pages.
(g)(1) The appellant shall file a Brief of Appellant, which shall present the
issues raised in the appeal.
(g)(2) The appellee shall then file one brief, entitled Brief of Appellee and
Cross-Appellant, which shall respond to the issues raised in the Brief of
Appellant and present the issues raised in the cross-appeal.
(g)(3) The appellant shall then file one brief, entitled Reply Brief of
Appellant and Brief of Cross-Appellee, which shall reply to the Brief of
Appellee and respond to the Brief of Cross-Appellant.
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(g)(4) The appellee may then file a Reply Brief of Cross-Appellant, which
shall reply to the Brief of Cross-Appellee.
(h) Permission for over length brief. While such motions are disfavored, the
court for good cause shown may upon motion permit a party to file a brief that
exceeds the limitations of this rule. The motion shall state with specificity the
issues to be briefed, the number of additional pages requested, and the good
cause for granting the motion. Amotion filed at least seven days before the date
the brief is due or seeking five or fewe*- additional pages need not be
accompanied by a copy of the brief. A motion filed less than seven days before
the date the brief is due and seeking more than 5 additional pages shall be
accompanied by a copy of the draft brief for in camera inspection. If the motion
is granted, any responding party is entitled to an equal number of additional
pages without further order of the court. Whether the motion is granted or
denied, the draft brief will be destroyed by the court.
(i) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases
involving more than one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for
purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join in a single brief, and any
appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of the brief of another.
Parties may similarly join in reply briefs.
(j) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant
authorities come to the attention of a party after that party's brief has been
filed, or after oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise
the clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth the citations. An original
letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original letter
and seven copies ^shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a
reference either to the page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the
citations pertain, but the letter shall without argument state the reasons for
the supplemental citations. Any response shall be made within 7 days of filing
and shall be similarly limited.
(k) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise,
presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free
from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which
are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte
by the court, and the court, may assess attorney fees against the offending
lawyer.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992; July 1, 1994; April 1,1995; April 1, 1998;
November 1, 1999; April 1, 2003; November 1, 2004; April 1, 2006; November
1, 2006.)
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 24
(a)(9) now reflects what Utah appellate courts
have long held. See In re Beesley, 883 P.2d 1343,
1349 (Utah 1994); Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745
R2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1987). "To successfully
appeal a trial court's findings of fact, appellate
counsel must play the devil's advocate. '[Attorneys] must extricate [themselves] from the client's shoes and fully assume the adversary's
position. In order to properly discharge the
[marshalling] duty..., the challenger must
present, in comprehensive and fastidious order,
every scrap of competent evidence introduced
at trial which supports the very findings the
appellant
resists/" ONEIDA/SLIC,
v.
ONEIDA Cold Storage and Warehouse, Inc.,
872 R2d 1051,1052-53 (Utah App. 1994) (alteration iri original) (quoting West Valley City v.
Majestic Inv. Co., 818 R2d 1311, 1315 (Utah
App. 1991)). See also State ex rel. M.S. v.
Salata, 806 P.2d 1216, 1218 (Utah App. 1991);

Bell v. Elder, 782 P.2d 545, 547 (Utah App.
1989); State v. Moore, 802 P2d 732, 738-39
(Utah App. 1990).
The brief must contain for each issue raised
on appeal, a statement of the applicable standard of review and citation of supporting authority.
Amendment Notes. — The 2003 amendment deleted Subdivision (k) pertaining to brief
covers.
The 2004 amendment added the last sentence in Subdivision (a)(9).
<;
The April 2006 amendment substituted "this
paragraph" for "this rule" in the last sentence in
Subdivision (g), deleted "and may be exceeded
only by permission of the court. The court shall
grant reasonable requests, for good cause
shown" from the end of Subdivision (b), and
added Subdivision (h), making related changes.
The 2006 amendment rewrote Subdivision
(g).
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Constitutional arguments.
Contents.
—Argument.
—Inadequate.
—Inappropriate language.
—Standard of review.
—Statement of facts with citation to record.
Failure to file.
—Defective appeal.
Issues not raised at trial.
Noncompliance with rule.
Preservation of issues.
Properly documented argument.
Reply brief.
Sanctions.
Cited.
Constitutional arguments.
In order to make an argument for an innovative interpretation of a state constitutional provision textually similar to a federal provision,
the following points should be developed and
supported with authority and analysis. First,
counsel should offer analysis of the unique
context in which Utah's constitution developed
with regard to the issue at hand. Second, counsel should demonstrate that state appellate
courts regularly interpret even textually similar state constitutional provisions in a manner
different from federal interpretations of the
United States Constitution and that it is en-,
tirely proper to do so in our federal system.
Third, citation should be made to authority
from other states supporting the particular
construction urged by counsel. State v. Bobo,
803 P.2d 1268 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Contents.
A brief must contain some support for each
contention.' State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960
(Utah 1989); State v. Reiners, 803 P.2d 1300
(Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Extensive quotations from numerous case
authorities and treatises, while helpful, cannot
substitute for the development of appellate
arguments explicitly tied to the record. West
Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311
(Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Appellant's brief was clearly deficient under
the provisions of this rule because it failed to
set forth a coherent statement of issues and the
appropriate standard of review for each issue
with supporting authority, the "issues" where
listed did not correlate with the substance of
the brief, the statement of the case not only
omitted reference to the course of proceedings
and disposition in the trial court, but failed to
provide a statement of the relevant facts properly documented by citations to the record, and
defendant's "argument" did not identify any
error by the trial court, refer to the facts or the
record, or cite applicable authority, much less
provide any meaningful factual or legal analysis. State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247 (Utah Ct. App.
1992).
It is improper to use an addendum to incorporate argument by reference that should be
included in the body of the brief. State v. Jiron,
866 P.2d 1249 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).

Appellate brief that set forth little legal analysis on issue presented, did not specifically
discuss how trial court erred, did not attempt to
marshal the evidence, and presented no citations to record failed to conform to requirements of this rule. Phillips v. Hatfield, 904 P.2d
1108 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
Briefs must contain reasoned analysis based
upon relevant legal authority. An issue is inadequately briefed when the overall analysis of
the issue is so lacking as to shift the burden of
research and argument to the reviewing court.
State v. Sloan, 2003 UT App 170,474 Utah Adv.
Rep. 44, 72 P.3d 138.
—Argument.
Appellants' brief, containing less than a single page of assertions and no citations to the
record, no legal authorities, and no analysis
whatsoever, was not in compliance with this
rule, which requires the brief of an appellant to
contain an argument. Christensen v. Munns,
812 P.2d 69 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Court declined to consider argument that
was not adequately briefed. See State ex rel
C.Y. v. Yates, 834 P.2d 599 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Defendant's failure to brief the applicability
of a common law construction (the good faith
exception to the warrant requirement) under
the Utah Constitution at the trial court level
and his subsequent failure to develop any
meaningful argument thereunder did not permit higher appellate review of these state constitutional claims, but left the analysis to proceed solely under federal constitutional law.
State v. Horton, 848 P.2d 708 (Utah Ct. App.),
cert, denied, 857 R2d 948 (Utah 1993).
Because appellant failed to provide adequate
legal analysis and legal authority in support of
his claims, his assertions did not permit appellate review. Burns v. Summerhays, 927 P.2d
197 (Utah Ct. App. 1996); Snow Flower
Homeowners Ass'n v. Snow Flower, Ltd., 2001
UT App 207, 31P.3d576.
Because the state failed to meet its briefing
duty under Subdivision (a)(9) as to the searchincident-to-arrest argument regarding circumstances involving defendant convicted of unlawful possession of a controlled substance, the
Court of Appeals declined to address the argument. State v. Montoya, 937 P.2d 145 (Utah Ct.
App. 1997).
Implicitly, Subdivision (a)(9) requires not just
bald citation to authority but development of
that authority and reasoned analysis based on
that authority. State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299
(Utah 1998).
While failure to cite to pertinent authority
may not always render an issue inadequately
briefed, it does so when the overall analysis of
the issue is so lacking as to shift the burden of
research and argument to the reviewing court.
State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299 (Utah 1998).
Brief that purported to present three arguments, supported by five points, but that failed
to cite legal authority and impermissibly
shifted the burden of analysis to the reviewing
court did not satify the requirements of this
rule. Smith v. Smith, 1999 UT App 370, 995
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P.2d 14, cert, denied, 4 R3d 1289 (Utah 2000).
Summary judgment for defendants was appropriate where plaintiff failed to provide any
reasons, as required by Subdivision (a)(9), to
support the contention that disputes of material of fact existed. Brown v. Wanlass, 2001 UT
App30, 18 P 3d 1137.
This rule requires not just bald citation to
authority but development of that authority
and reasoned analysis based on that authority
in order for an appellate issue to be adequately
briefed. Spencer v. Pleasant View City, 2003 UT
App 379, 486 Utah Adv. Rep. 30, 80 P.3d 546.
Because brief failed to articulate why a district court erred in dismissing a county from a
lawsuit or any theory as to how the county was
liable for a patient's suicide, there was no
reason to address an appeal from the dismissal.
Davis v. Cent. Utah Counseling Ctr., 2006 UT
52, 147 P 3d 390.

trial court's allowing lay opinion regarding the
supposed reasonableness of a defendant's driving conduct, but the defendant failed to specifically cite any such testimony in the record, the
Supreme Court refused to address the issue
under this rule. Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425
(Utah 1998).
Where defendant argued that he was not
advised, at the time of his prior convictions for
driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), of
the possibility of enhancement if defendant was,
again convicted in the future, and argued that
the state had not provided written evidence to
prove that defendant was so advised, it was
defendant's burden, not the state's, to provide
citations to the record to support his arguments
that he was not so advised. State v. Marshall,
2003 UT App 381, 486 Utah Adv. Rep. 55, 81
P3d 775, cert, denied, 87 R3d 1163 (Utah
2004), cert, denied, 90 P.3d 1041 (Utah 2004).

—Inadequate.
Brief listing a disjointed array of facts selected because they aided appellant's cause,
containing legal analysis that was little more
than a conclusory statement unsupported by
analysis or authority, and that failed to cite
properly to the record, a failing that required
the court to research and review the voluminous record itself to uncover the factual underpinnings of defendant's assertions, was inadequate. State v. Green, 2005 UT 9,518 Utah Adv.
Rep. 30, 108 P.3d 710.

Failure to file.

—Inappropriate language.
Derogatory references to others or inappropriate language of any kind has no place in an
appellate brief and is of no assistance in attempting to resolve any legitimate issues presented on appeal. State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296
(Utah 1986).
—Standard of review.
The standard of review requirement in Subdivision (a)(5) should not be ignored. The purpose of the requirement is to focus the briefs,
thus promoting more accuracy and efficiency in
the processing of appeals. Christensen v.
Munns, 812P.2d 69 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
—Statement of facts with citation to«
record.
The Supreme Court need not, and will not,
consider any facts not properly cited to, or
supported by, the record. Uckerman v. Lincoln
Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 588 P.2d 142 (Utah 1978).
The Supreme Court will assume the correctness of the judgment in a criminal trial if
counsel on appeal does not comply with the
requirements as to making a concise statement
of facts and citation of the pages in the record
where they are supported. State v. Tucker, 657
P.2d 755 (Utah 1982).
If a party fails to'make a concise statement of
the facts and citation of the pages in the record
where those facts are supported, the court will
assume the correctness of the judgment below.
Koulis v. Standard Oil Co., 746 P.2d 1182 (Utah
Ct. App. 1987); Steele v. Board of Review of
Indus. Comm'n, 845 P.2d 960 (Utah Ct. App.
1993).
Where the plaintiff appealed the issue of the

—Defective appeal.
Where defendant was convicted of operating
a motor venicle without insurance, and attempted to file his appeal pro se, but failed to
file a brief or submit a transcript of the record,
there was no reversible error presented which
would permit the appellate "court to' reverse the
judgment. State v. Hansen, 540 R2d 935 (Utah
1975).
Issues not raised at trial.
An appellate court may address an issue
raised for the first time on appeal if appellant
establishes that the trial court committed plain
error, if there are exceptional circumstances, or,
in some situations, if a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel is raised on appeal. State
v. Irwin, 924 R2d 5 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), cert,
denied, 931 P.2d 146 (Utah 1997).
The exceptional circumstances concept
serves to assure that manifest injustice does
-hot result from the failure to consider an issue
on appeal. State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5 (Utah Ct.
App. 1996), cert, denied, 931 P2d 146 (Utah
1997).
The fact that liberty is at stake is not sufficient basis for deviating from the general rule
requiring the appellant to raise the issue at
trial,in order to argue it on appeal. State v.
Irwin, 924 P.2d 5 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), cert,
denied, 931 P.2d 146 (Utah 1997).
The trial counsel's failure to object to the
prosecution's apparently improper remarks at
sentencing, even in conjunction with the expiration of the time within which to make a
timely motion to withdraw the plea, is not a
substantial enough procedural anomaly to invoke the exceptional circumstances concept
which would allow appellant to raise an issue
on appeal for the first time. State v. Irwin, 924
P.2d 5 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), cert, denied, 931
P.2d 146 (Utah 1997).
Because plaintiff had not properly raised
three issues in the trial court that he raised on
appeal, and because he argued plain error or
manifest injustice for the first time in his reply
brief, the court refused to review the three
issues. Coleman v. Stevens, 2000 UT 98,17 P.3d
1122.
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Because plaintiff raised issues for the first
time on appeal concerning breach of contract
and battery claims, and did not argue plain
error or exceptional circumstances in the dismissal of those claims, the court declined to
address the issues and affirmed the grant of
summary judgment thereon. Walter v. Stewart,
2003 UT App 86, 67 P.3d 1042, cert, denied, 73
P.3d 946 (2003).
Noncompliance with rule.
The Supreme Court declined to address any
of the arguments raised in a brief that failed to
meet almost every requirement of this rule.
MacKay v. Hardy, 973 R2d 941 (Utah 1998).
The court declined to consider the merits of
the issues briefed where defendant's brief failed
to cite relevant legal authority or provide any
meaningful analysis. State v. Shepherd, 1999
UT App 305, 989P.2d503.
Defendant's brief did not adequately set forth
an argument as required by Subdivision (a)(9)
of this rule. However, because the court was not
obligated to strike or disregard a marginal or
inadequate brief, in the interests of justice, the
court chose chose to address defendant's arguments. State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, 1 P.3d
1108.
In defendant's appeal of convictions for terroristic threat and threatening an elected official, his failure to provide adequate legal analysis or authority to support his contentions on
appeal did not permit any meaningful review
by the appellate court; his brief failed to comply
with the requirements or purpose of this rule
and his convictions were accordingly affirmed.
State v. Lucero, 2002 UT App 135, 47 P3d 107.
Appellate court temporarily remanded an
appeal to the trial court for appointment of new
counsel for defendant because the brief filed by
defendant's appellate counsel was wholly inadequate for its failure to contain a statement of
grounds for seeking review of an issue not
preserved in the trial court and defendant
raised Fourth Amendment claims that were not
preserved for appeal. Ogden City v. Stites, 2002
UT App 357, 58R3d865.
Where a party failed to marshal the evidence
and properly brief the issues that it raised on
appeal and instead indicated that it could not
marshal the evidence because the court had
imposed a 100-page limit which forced it to rely
on its addenda to satisfy its marshaling burden,
and additionally, where it failed to attempt to
meet its burden of demonstrating that the trial
jcourt's findings of fact were clearly erroneous,
which was the issue raised, the appellate court
declined to review the issue. Aspenwood, L.L.C.
v. C.A.T., L.L.C, 2003 UT App 28, 466 Utah
Adv. Rep. 7, 73 P.3d 947, cert, denied, 72 P3d
685 (2003).
In action by investors relating to their losses
in a failed investment venture, because the
investors failed to brief the dismissal of five of
their causes of action, they waived the opportunity to appeal the dismissal. Coroles v. Sabey,
2003 UT App 339, 485 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 79 P.3d
974.
Defendant, convicted of rape and aggravated
sexual abuse of a child, did not specifically set
forth hearsay statements he challenged on re-

view nor did he provide any relevant facts for
review. Accordingly, the court could not consider the argument as it failed to comply with
this rule. (Unpublished decision.) State v.
Timsanico, 2005 UT App 158.
In a partition action, because tenant in common failed to marshal the evidence to support
its argument that a mine company, the other
tenant in common, had waived its right to
partition, the appellate court assumed that the
trial court's findings were supported by the
evidence. United Park City Mines Co. v.
Stichting Mayflower Mt. Fonds, 2006 UT 35,
140 P.3d 1200.
Preservation of issues.
Plaintiff's First Amendment argument was
not properly preserved for appeal because it
failed to meet the requirements of specificity
and citation to authority. In his motion for
summary judgment and his motion in limine,
plaintiff made a generalized argument that his
conduct towards defendant was protected by
his First Amendment right to petition the government; however, in neither motion did plaintiff cite any relevant authority that supported
that proposition, and he did not argue that
defendant was required to prove that plaintiff's
statements were made with "actual malice."
Hatch v. Davis, 2004 UT App 378, 511 Utah
Adv. Rep. 16, 102 P.3d 774.
Properly documented argument.
Brief that was filled with burdensome, emotional, immaterial and inaccurate arguments
did not set forth a properly documented argument as required by this rule; therefore the
court disregarded it. Koulis v. Standard Oil Co.,
746 P.2d 1182 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Where a city failed to demonstrate by way of
statute, ordinance, case law, or other authority
how failure to file a site plan could defeat or
invalidate an otherwise legal nonconforming
use, the court rejected the city's contention
regarding the nonconforming use. Hugoe v.
Woods Cross City, 1999 UT App 281, 988 P2d
456.
The plaintiff's general statement that the
trial court's finding that a lessee placed a sign
for the purpose of "forestalling competitive activity" supported a violation of the antitrust
statute was insufficient to persuade the appellate court that a violation occurred. U.P.C., Inc.
v. R.O.A. General, Inc., 1999 UT App 303, 990
P.2d 945.
Reply brief.
As a general rule, an issue raised initially in
a reply brief will not be considered on appeal,
although the court, in its discretion, may decided a case upon any points that its proper
disposition may require, even if first raised in a
reply brief. Romrell v. Zions First Nat'l Bank,
611 P.2d 392 (Utah 1980).
Observation by the state in a footnote that
defendant had not raised a particular issue in
the trial court or in his opening brief on appeal
did not constitute a "new matter" entitling
defendant to brief the issue in his reply brief.
State v. Kruger, 2000 UT 60, 6 P3d 1116.
Sanctions.
Trial court properly awarded attorney's fees
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to defendant as a sanction against plaintiff
whose brief was extraordinarily deficient. The
brief w a s bereft of any organizational coherericy or structure and the arguments were for
the most part unsupported by any specific legal
citation or analysis. Nipper v. Douglas, 2004
UT App 118, 497 Utah Adv. Rep. 11, 90 P.3d
649, cert, denied, 94 P.3d 929 (Utah 2004).
Cited in Weber v. Snyderville West, 800 P.2d
316 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); State v. Hoyt, 806
P.2d 204 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); State ex rel.
M.S. v. Salata, 806 P.2d 1216 (Utah Ct. App.
1991); State v. Cayer, 814 P.2d 604 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991); English v. Standard Optical Co.,
814 P.2d 613 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Hinckley v.
Hinckley, 815 P.2d 1352 (Utah Ct. App. 1991);
Larson v. Overland Thrift & Loan, 818 P.2d
1316 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); State v. Davis, 821
P.2d 9 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); State v. Garza, 820
P.2d 937 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Johnson-Bowles
Co. v. Department of Commerce, 829 P.2d 101
(Utah Ct. App. 1991); Middlestadt v. Indus.
Comm'n, 852 P.2d 1012 (Utah Ct. App. 1993);
Baker v. Baker, 866 P.2d 540 (Utah Ct. App.
1993); Barney v. Utah Dep't of Commerce, 885

R2d 809 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Reeves v.
Steinfeldt, 915 R2d 1073 (Utah Ct. App. 1996);
State v. Bryant, 965 R2d 539 (Utah Ct. App.
1998); SNtate v. Fisher, 972 P.2d 90 (Utah Ct.
App. 1998); State v. Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App
1 8 6 > 5 p>3d 1 2 22; Holmstrom v. C.R. England,
I n C j 2 000 UT App 239, 8 P.3d 281; State v.
Helmick, 2000 UT 70, 9 P.3d 164; Gorostieta v.
Parkinson, 2000 UT 99, 17 P.3d 1110; Ellis v.
Swensen, 2000 UT 101,16 P.3d 1233; Rackley v
Fairview Care Ctrs., Inc., 2001 UT 32, 23 P.3d
1022; F.R. v. State, 2001 UT App 66, 21 P.3d
680; Associated Gen. Contractors v. Board of
Oil, Gas & Mining, 2001 UT 112, 38 P.3d 291;
State v. Honie, 2002 UT 4, 57 R3d 977, cert.
denied, 537 U.S. 863,123 S. Ct. 257,154 L. Ed.
2d 105 (2002); Weber County v. Chambers, 2001
UT 53, 28 P.'3d 694; State v. Waldron, 2002 UT
App 175, 51 P.3d 21; State v. Werner, 2003 UT
App 268, 478 Utah Adv. Rep. 37, 76 P.3d 204;
Davis v. Davis, 2003 UT App 282,479 Utah Adv.
Rep. 6, 76 P.3d 716; Save Our Schools v. Board
of Educ, 2005 UT 55, 122 P.3d 611; Chang v.
Soldier Summit Dev., 2003 UT App 415, 488
Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 82 P.3d 203.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate
Review § 540 et seq.

C.J.S. — 4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 605 et
seq.

Rule 25. Brief of an amicus curiae or guardian ad litem.
A brief of an amicus curiae or of a guardian ad litem representing a minor
who is not a party to the appeal may be filed only by leave of court granted on
motion or at the request of the court. Parties to tjhe case may indicate their
support for, or opposition to, the motion. A motion for leave shall identify the
interest of the applicant and shall state the reasons why a brief of an amicus
curiae or the guardian ad litem is desirable. Except as, all parties otherwise
consent, an amicus curiae or guardian ad litem shall file its brief within the
time allowed the party whose position as to affirmance or reversal the amicus
curiae or guardian ad litem will support, unless the court for cause shown
otherwise orders. A motion of an amicus curiae or guardian ad litem to
participate in the oral argument will be granted when circumstances warrant
in the court's discretion.
(Amended effective April 1, 2004.)
Amendment Notes. — The 2004 amendment deleted "if accompanied by written consent of all narties. or" after "may be filed only"

in the first sentence and added the second
sentence,

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate
Review § 540.

Rule 26. Filing and service of briefs.
(a) Time for service and filing briefs. Briefs shall be deemed filed on the date
of the postmark if first-class mail is utilized. The appellant shall serve and file
a brief within 40 days after date of notice from the clerk of the appellate court
pursuant to Rule 13. If a motion for summary disposition of the appeal or a
motion to remand for determination of ineffective assistance of counsel is filed
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ADDENDUM C
Trial Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

HIED DISTRICT mum
GEORGE A. HUNT (A1586)
STEPHEN T. HESTER (9981)
WILLIAMS & HUNT
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Andrew and Joan Gallegos
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
Post Office Box 45678
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678
Phone (801) 521.5678
Facsimile (801) 364.4500

Third Judicial District

JUL t 9 2006

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ANDREW GALLEGOS and JOAN
GALLEGOS,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiffs,
Case No. 040916534
Judge John Paul Kennedy
JAMES LLOYD; JULIE LLOYD;
MOUNTAIN AMERICA FEDERAL CREDIT
UNION, a Utah non-profit corporation;
MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC
REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., a Delaware
corporation, as nominee for COUNTRYWIDE
HOME LOANS, INC., a New York corporation,
dba AMERICA'S WHOLESALE LENDER; J.
SCOTT LUNDBERG, trustee; and CAREY
JOHANSEN dba LAND DESIGN,
Defendants.
This matter came on regularly for trial before the above-entitled Court on June 27th
and 28 th , 2006, with the Honorable John Paul Kennedy, District Judge, presiding without a
jury. Plaintiffs were present and represented by their counsel, George A. Hunt and

Stephen T. Hester of Williams & Hunt. Defendants James and Julie Lloyd were present
and represented by their counsel, T. Richard Davis of Callister, Nebeker & McCullough.
Defendant Mountain America Federal Credit Union was present and represented by its
counsel William G. Wilson of Scalley & Reading, and Defendant Countrywide Home
Loans, Inc. was present and represented by its counsel, Darren K. Nelson of Parr,
Waddoups, Brown & Gee. Witnesses were sworn and counsel elicited testimony from the
witnesses, presented documentary exhibits and argued their respective positions to the
Court. The parties then submitted the case for decision and the Court issued a ruling from
the bench at the close of trial. Consistent with that ruling and in support thereof, the Court
now enters the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Plaintiffs, Andrew and Joan Gallegos (the "Gallegos"') are record owners

of real property located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, more specifically described as
Lot 102 Emigration Oalcs Subdivision, Phase III, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84108 ("Lot 102").
2.

Defendants James and Julie Lloyd (the "Lloyds") are the record owners and

residents of real property located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, more specifically
described as Lot 106 Emigration Oaks Subdivision, Phase V, commonly known as 5982
Pioneer Fork Road, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84108 ("Lot 106").
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3.

Defendant Mountain American Federal Credit Union ("Mountain America")

is a Utah non-profit corporation and a federally chartered credit union with its principal
place of business in West Jordan, Salt Lake County, Utah.
4.

Defendant Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Inc. ("MERS") is a

Delaware corporation licensed to do business in Salt Lake County, Utah and is acting as
nominee for Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., a New York corporation, dba America's
Wholesale Lender ("Countrywide").
5.

Lots 102 and 106 share a common property line. The common property line

is situated on top of a ridge.
6.

In 1993, the Gallegos purchased Lot 102 of the Emigration Oaks

Subdivision, Phase III, in order to build their dream home sometime in the future.
7.

In June of 1996, Defendants James and Julie Lloyd purchased Lot 106 of the

Emigration Oaks Subdivision, Phase V. The topography of Lot 106 was a slope elevating
from the east property line up to the west property line shared with Lot 102.
8.

In an effort to improve Lot 106, the Lloyds engaged the services of Mr.

James Carroll to provide architectural drawings of a home to be built on Lot 106.
9.

Mr. Carroll provided detailed drawings of the Lloyds future home, including

a site plan, to the Lloyds and submitted the drawings and site plan to Salt Lake County to
gain approval to begin construction on Lot 106 (the "Lot 106 Site Plan"). Mr. Carroll
3

denies inspecting the construction of the Lloyd Home to ensure compliance with the
requirements of the Lot 106 Site Plan, although he visited the property five or six times
during construction.
10.

No evidence was presented regarding whether Defendants Mountain America

and Countrywide (who hold deeds of trust against Lot 106) inspected the construction of
the Lloyd home to ensure compliance with the Lot 106 Site Plan, nor was any argument
made that they had a duty to do so.
11.

Salt Lake County approved the Lot 106 Site Plan in or about August 1996

and the Lloyds began construction of their home (the "Lloyd Home5') immediately
thereafter.
12.

Mr. Lloyd acted as the general contractor overseeing the construction of the

Lloyd Home. Mrs. Lloyd assisted Mr. Lloyd in his duties as general contractor by
reviewing and paying invoices of subcontractors.
13.

The Lloyd Home was neither staked nor constructed according to the

requirements of the Lot 106 Site Plan. The Lloyd Home was staked on Lot 106 in such a
way that a portion of the home was built upon, and in fact encroached upon, Lot 102.
14.

The Lloyd's assertion that they were unaware of the fact that the construction

of their home was not proceeding according to the Lot 106 Site Plan and, hence, that they
were not aware of any potential encroachment onto Lot 102, is not credible. Likewise, the
4

Lloyd's assertion that they relied upon other professionals to properly stake theire home or
notify them that their home was not located according to the Lot 106 Site Plan, is not
credible.
15.

There were several physical markers required by the Lot 106 Site Plan which

never materialized during the construction of the Lloyd's home. These markers included:
1) the presence of a 12 to 14 foot high embankment on the west side of the Lloyd Home;
2) the presence of two large retaining walls on both the west and east side of the driveway;
and 3) an average grade on the driveway of 8.5% with a maximum grade of 10%. The
absence of these markers provided unmistakable notice to the Lloyd's that their home was
being constructed in the wrong location.
16.

The Lloyds were negligent in going forward with the construction of their

home as staked because the Lloyds knew, or should have known, that the staking and
subsequent construction of their home violated the requirements of the Lot 106 Site Plan.
17.

The Lloyds disregarded the requirements of the Lot 106 Site Plan to their

considerable advantage.
18.

Motive existed for the Lloyds to ignore the requirements of the Lot 106 Site

Plan. This motive included: 1) avoiding increased excavation costs associated with the
excavation required by the Lot 106 Site Plan; 2) an improved view with southern exposure;
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and 3) constructing a relatively flat driveway rather than the average 8.5% slope
contemplated by the Lot 106 Site Plan.
19.

In July 1997, the Lloyds finished construction of their home on Lot 106. As

a result of the Lloyd's actions and/or omissions, the home encroached upon Lot 102, well
beyond the minimal set back and side yard requirements required by the Lot 106 Site Plan.
20.

In disregarding the requirements of the Lot 106 Site Plan, the Lloyds

intended to build their home in such a way that resulted in the unlawful invasion of the
Gallegos" property.
21.

As a result of the Lloyds3 disregard for the requirements of the Lot 106 Site

Plan, the Lloyd Home is fifteen feet higher in elevation than contemplated by the Lot 106
Site Plan and sits laterally over forty feet west of its designated location.
22.

The ultimate siting of the Lloyd Home interfered with the Gallegos3 view

from Lot 102.
23.

As a result of the Lloyds5 encroachment on to Lot 102, the Gallegos were

unable to build a home on Lot 102 pursuant to architectural designs they had previously
developed and purchased.
24.

As a further result of the Lloyds' encroachment on to Lot 102, the Gallegos

were unable to determine when they would be able to obtain a building permit for Lot 102
and commence construction. Due to the indeterminable delay in commencing construction
6

on Lot 102, the Gallegos purchased Lot 14 in Phase I of the Emigration Oaks Subdivision
and proceeded with a new home design.
25.

As a direct consequence of Mr. Lloyd's actions and/or omissions, the Gallegos

incurred architectural and storage fees that they would not have otherwise incurred, and
paid taxes on property being occupied and utilized by the Lloyds.
26.

The amount of the damages suffered by the Gallegos as a direct consequence

of the trespass of the Lloyds, are as follows:
Architectural Fees
Taxes
Storage Fees

$39,500.00
2,753.31
2,300.00

Lost Property Value

27,500.00

TOTAL
27.

$72,053.31

The encroachment and damages for taxes will continue until the boundary

can be adjusted and approved by the Emigration Oaks Homeowners Association and any
and all local authorities having jurisdiction over such matters. The correct approach to
adjustment is the approach suggested by the Gallegos5 expert witness, Mr. Jerry Webber,
viz., transfer a 38 foot wide strip along Lot 102fs eastern boundary to the Lloyds in
consideration of the $27,500 in damages noted in 11 25, above. Such adjustment will
require the services of a licensed surveyor and the Lloyds should pay all such costs, together
with any and all fees and other costs associated with adjusting the respective property
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boundaries and obtaining approval from the Emigration Oaks Homeowners Association
and any and all local authorities having jurisdiction over such matters.
28.

Moving or demolishing the Lloyd home would involve economic waste and

therefore the boundary adjustment mechanism described above is the most equitable
method of resolving the encroachment.
29.

As a direct consequence of the actions and/or omissions of the Lloyds, the

Gallegos were required to obtain counsel and pursue this action in order to resolve the
boundary encroachment, adjust the lot boundaries, and render Lot 102 usable and
marketable. The Lloyds initiated no action to address or resolve their trespass. In addition,
the Lloyds failed to act in good faith in their defense of this action. In particular, the
Lloyds lacked an honest belief in the propriety of their actions and, ultimately, took
advantage of Plaintiffs' property rights of which they knew or should have known. Their
defense to the Gallegos' claims was without merit. The amount of Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees
incurred should be established by motion pursuant to Rule 73, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
30.

The Court did not find by clear and convincing evidence that the actions

and/or omissions of the Lloyds were the result of willful and malicious or intentionally
fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward
the rights of the Gallegos.
8

FROM THE foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court draws the following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

This Court has personal jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter

jurisdiction over this action.
2.

Venue is properly laid in this District.

3.

The Gallegos were, at all relevant times, in actual possession of Lot 102.

4.

The Lloyds trespassed on to Lot 102 by causing their home to be built in

such a fashion and location that it encroaches on Lot 102.
5.

Acting as the general contractor in building his own home, Mr. Lloyd owed

the Gallegos a duty to situate the location of his home with reasonable care and to ensure
that his home was constructed according to the Lot 106 Site Plan.
6.

Mr. Lloyd breached that duty by staking the Lloyd Home in such a way as to

cause the home to be situated and constructed so that it encroached upon Lot 102.
7.

The Lloyd's knew or should have known that their home was not staked or

constructed according to the requirements of the Lot 106 Site Plan but proceeded with
construction anyway.
8.

It was foreseeable that, as a result of Mr. Lloyd's breach of his duty to

properly stake his home and ensure that it was constructed according to the requirements of
the Lot 106 Site Plan, the Gallegos would suffer damages.
9

9.

The Lloyd's actions and/or omissions caused the Gallegos to be damaged.

10.

Mr. Lloyd acted unreasonably in proceeding with construction of the Lloyd

Home in violation of the Lot 106 Site Plan.
11.

It was reasonable for the Gallegos to pursue the design and construction of a

new home on Lot 14 in the Emigration Oaks Subdivision as a result of the Lloyds5
encroachment on Lot 102.
12.

As a result of the Lloyds5 encroachment upon Lot 102, the Gallegos should

recover damages consisting of: 1) architectural fees in the amount of $39,500.00; 2) taxes
paid on Lot 102 in the amount of $2,753.31 and continuing until property boundary is redrawn; 3) storage fees of $2,300.00; and 4) diminution in value of Lot 102 in the amount
of $27,500.00.
13.

As a further result of the Lloyds5 encroachment upon Lot 102, the Gallegos

suffered consequential damages in the form of attorneys fees which should be recovered. In
addition, based on the documentary evidence and witness testimony presented at trial, the
Lloyds5 defense of this action was without merit and not asserted in good faith.
Accordingly, attorney's fees should be awarded to Plaintiffs under Utah Code Ann. § 7827-56, the amount to be established by motion under Rules 54 and 73 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.

10

14.

As a further result of the Lloyds5 encroachment on to Lot 102, the property

boundary between Lot 102 and Lot 106 must be re-drawn in accordance with the expert
report of Mr. Jerry Webber. The new property boundary should run parallel with the
existing property boundary and should include approximately 7,800 square feet of Lot 102.
In the event that the property added by the boundary adjustment contains any scrub oak,
the conveyance should provide a perpetual easement encompassing that scrub oak thereby
preventing its destruction and/or removal.
15.

The fees and costs associated with preparing the new property boundary and

obtaining approval of the new property boundary from the Emigration Oaks Homeowners
Association and any and all local authorities having jurisdiction over such matters, should be
paid by the Lloyds.
16.

No award of punitive damages should be made in this matter.

17.

Defendants Mountain America and Countrywide are not culpable in this

matter and are not responsible for any of the damages suffered by Plaintiffs. Accordingly,
they should be dismissed from this action.
18.

The Court should retain jurisdiction over this matter until the property

boundary adjustment is completed and all costs and fees associated therewith have been paid
in full.
19.

The Court should enter a Judgment and Decree consistent herewith.
11

DATED this

i t day

APPROVED AS TO FORM

WILLIAM G. WILSON

fh,(Yf/\ / C M & ^
DARREN K. NELSON

129443 1
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ADDENDUM D
Transcript of Ruling Only on 6/28/06 and Motion on Attorney's Fees on 11/2/06

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE CITY
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ANDREW GALLEGOS, et al.,

Case No. 040916534 PR

Plaintiffs,
vs.

Appellate Case 20061135-SC

JAMES LLOYD, et al.,
Defendants.
June 28,2006
November 2,2006

With Keyword Index
RULING ONLY
MOTION ON ATTORNEY'S FEES

Page 1
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BEFORE
THE HONORABLE JOHN PAUL KENNEDY

FILED DISTBIST COURT
Third Judicial District

JAN 3 1 2007
JM.

SALT LAKE COUNTY

By.
Deputy Clerk

CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER
1775 East Ellen Way
Sandy, Utah 84092
801-523-1186

1

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH - JUNE 28, 200 6

2

JUDGE JOHN PAUL KENNEDY PRESIDING

3

(Transcriber's note: Speaker identification

4

may not be accurate with audio recordings)

5

^PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT - RULING ONLY*

6

P R O C E E D I N G S

7

THE COURT: Well, I think as our discussion focused

8

here, the problem appears to be that no one seems to be able

9

to say how long the process of being able to get a building

10

permit would have taken.

11

were under some sort of unique family pressures that prompted

12

them to need to act.

13

lot and proceed with the house on that location, on Location

14

14, was a reasonable decision given the facts.

15

The testimony was that Gallegoses

I find that their decision to buy a new

I find also that Mr. Lloyd was certainly negligent

16

in going forward with the construction on his home in the

17

location in which it was ultimately situated which I find in

18

violation of the approved site plan.

19

I find that if the lot were, in fact, staked as it

20

was built, it was not reasonable for him to rely on that

21

staking.

22

that it was correct.

23

should have known that the house was in the wrong place but

24

he proceeded anyway.

25

There were too many other indications to indicate
I would find that he either knew or

I find that he - that motivations existed to build

1

where he did and that those included saving money and

2

excavation costs, improving the view, and access and general

3

layout of the lot,

4

I find that the house, as built, is about 15 feet

5

higher than it should have been if it had been built

6

according to the approved site plan.

7

ultimate citing of the house, of the Lloyds, in fact,

8

interfered with their view, particularly with respect to the

9

upper floors of the house.

And I find that that

And I think if you look at the

10

drawings you'11 see that the upper floors went up as high as

11

20 some feet and I don't think a photo from a 12-foot level

12

covers that.

13

winter time, I don't think that any of the trees would cover

14

the Lloyd's home even from the lower floors.

15

In addition, I don't think, especially in the

So, I find that defendant's actions have caused

16

plaintiffs damages in a number of areas.

I think with

17

respect to the architect's billings, I find that they appear

18

to be reasonable and necessary in all respects except I don't

19

believe that the conversion drawings were justified.

20

there could have been a decision made to just go ahead and

21

junk the original drawings and go forward with new ones and I

22

think they would have saved, as I recall, approximately

23

$11,000, $12,000.

I think

24

In addition, I saw some other costs relating to the

25

boundary issues which didn't appear to me to be legitimate in

1

terms of timing, and also, there was some legal costs tacked

2

on.

3

did not allow that.

4

architect's costs and fees were justified.

5

taxes of $2,753.31 through the date calculated were justified

6

and would continue until the trespass is abated in some

7

fashion.

8
9

I wasn't quite sure why those would be justified, so I
But I felt that $39,500 worth of
I felt that the

We'll talk about that in a minute.
With respect to storage, I also agreed with the

defense counsel on that one.

It was hard for me to see all

10

of that storage as being legitimate and my feeling was that

11

it would be reasonable to incur some of that expense, but not

12

all of it, and so I've - and plus I think some of it was

13

shown to not be appropriate in the testimony.

14

storage, I order $2,300.

15

So, on

With respect to the diminution of value, we had a

16

range, as I recall it went from a number in Exhibit 15, as I

17

recall was 35 8, and I think Mr. Cook's number was

18

significantly lower than that.

19

calculated on a basis of a square-footage number and I came

20

up with something like $19,800.

21

estimates and rationale were not as persuasive or as credible

22

as Mr. Webber's, but, nonetheless, I thought some of Mr.

23

Webber's were a little overstated.

24

respect to the diminution in value - and this is based on an

25

assumption that we would have a slice taken out of the

I tried to do some rough

I felt that Mr. Cook's

So, my feeling is with

1

Gallegos' property equivalent to 7,800 feet.

2

in value would be $27,500.

3

The diminution

Now, I found that the lenders are not culpable in

4

this matter.

Maybe if they had somebody who was looking over

5

the documents and actually going out and checking the

6

property, some of these problems could have been avoided, but

7

I don't think there's any evidence to show that that's the

8

practice and, for what it's worth, my personal experience is

9

that they don't usually do that anyway.

So, I'm not going to

10

find them liable or responsible for any of these damages,

11

that the damages that I found are going to be the

12

responsibility of the Lloyds.

13

The thing that I struggle with the most is how

14

anyone can say, given these facts and my findings, that what

15

the Lloyds did wasn't either reckless disregard of the rights

16

of the plaintiffs, gross negligence or willful, a willful act

17

and I think to make such a finding, I need clear and

18

convincing evidence.

19

but I can tell you that it's by the slimmest of margin that

20

I'm not making such a finding.

21

I'm not going to make such a finding,

I do feel that the actions of the Lloyds have

22

resulted in consequential damages to the Gallegoses, and in

23

this case, I think those consequential damages include

24

attorney's fees.

25

this case I think it's clear that they should have known that

I wouldn't find that in every case, but in

1

their disregard of all of these indicators, could have and

2

probably would have resulted in serious problems which would

3

have in turn resolved in, in all likelihood, in extensive

4

litigation costs.

5

consequential damages the attorney's fees incurred by the

6

plaintiffs in this case.

So, as a result, I'm finding as

7

And I'm not going to award punitive damages.

8

Now, with respect to the property boundary, it

9

would seem to me that we need to redraw the boundary for this

10

property.

11

I would accept the opinion of Mr. Webber that to make that

12

line either irregular or at an angle would end up as a

13

disservice to this particular piece of property and would

14

negatively impact its value.

15

to run parallel to the existing property line and as number

16

feet over that it would need to be to equal that 7,800 square

17

feet.

18

it was on the order of 38 feet or thereabouts.

19

As I've indicated, I think 7,800 square feet, and

So, I would require that line

I don't know what the exact number of feet is, I think

The costs for preparing the new boundary and

20

getting it approved through the homeowners' association, as

21

well as through many local authorities, like the county, are

22

to be borne by Lloyds.

23

the new property line, goes through any existing scrub oak I

24

would place a perpetual easement protecting that scrub oak as

25

well, so that if some of that scrub oak ends up on his part

In the event that that property line,

1

of the line, he will not be able to go cut it down.

2

I'm going to leave the issues with respect to the

3

septic tank to further resolution in the normal course

4

through the homeowners' association and if the parties, if

5

whoever ends up owning that lot wants to work something out,

6

fine, but otherwise, I'm not going to require anything

7

specific on that.

8

I'm going to ask you, Mr. - well, I think it's

9

probably better for the plaintiff, for you, Mr. Hunt, to

10

prepare the order in this matter but I want you to do it in

11

close cooperation with Mr. Davis-

12

MR. HUNT: Sure.

13

THE COURT: - so that you get his input.

I think

14

both of you are extremely capable, competent, reasonable

15

attorneys. And I think - I want to complement you both on

16

the job that you've done here in this trial over the last two

17

days.

18

I think you both have done an excellent job.
And I don't know how much in terms of punitive

19

damages you've saved your client, Mr. Davis, but conceivably

20

a lot by your arguments today.

21

arguments and they've been persuasive on that issue as well

22

as the other issues and I would complement each of you on

23

what you presented.

24

together and try to work out something that would make sense.

25

I think they've been good

So, I would ask you both to work

Anything further from either side?

1

MR. HUNT: Got a question, Your Honor.

The award of

2

attorney's fees and you're calling that consequential

3

damages, not either allowed by statute or by contract, but

4

just as consequential damages; is that what I understand?

5

THE COURT: Well, I guess I have two choices.

I

6

guess I could find punitive, a need for punitive damages here

7

and award them in that context, or I could put them in as

8

consequential damages on the other hand and it would seem to

9

me to be, it would save further hearing on a punitive damage

10

award.

11

awarded punitive damages here, but I think consequential

12

damages are appropriate.

13

As I say, by the slimmest of margin, I have not

MR. HUNT: Your Honor, if I may speak to that.

I

14

think also the Court has the latitude to find that the

15

position advanced by the Lloyds in defense of the client is

16

not credible and that gives the Court latitude under 78-27-

17

56.

18
19

THE COURT: Well, and I would - I would so find
that.

I think that that's - warrant that.

20
21

MR. HUNT: We can submit that by motion and
affidavit in dealing with the amount or-

22
23

THE COURT: Again, have Mr. Davis look that over
carefully.

24

MR. HUNT: Sure.

25

THE COURT: Anything further?

1

MR. HUNT: No, thank you, Your Honor.

2

MR. DAVIS: No, Your Honor.

3

THE COURT: Okay.

4 I

(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)

Then we will be in recess,

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
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22
23
24
25 I
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8
9

THE COURT: We're here on the Gallegos versus Lloyd
matter.

10
11

MR. HUNT: George Hunt for the plaintiffs, Andy and
Joan Gallegos.

12
13

Do you want to state your appearances?

MR. DAVIS: Richard Davis on behalf of Defendants
Lloyd.

14

THE COURT: Okay. We are convened today to discuss

15

the plaintiffs' motion for attorney's fees which has been

16

objected to by Mr. Davis on behalf of his clients, the

17

Lloyds.

18

that the petition should be denied?

19
20

So, Mr. Davis, why don't you tell me why you think

MR. DAVIS: Thank you, Your Honor. Would you like me
to stand?

21

There are actually three issues here and I think we

22

began to discuss these at the very end of the trial after the

23

Court delivered its findings from the bench, and we discussed

24

the issue of how the attorney's fees can be awarded, whether

25

they be consequential damages or what and the questions were

1

made and the Court was fairly direct in saying, "I would like

2

these to be consequential damages," notwithstanding the

3

issues that were raised.

4

he could substantiate them under the bad faith statute.

5

Mr. Hunt raised the issue of, that

Since that time and pursuant to the rule, once the

6

attorney's fee issue then is brought to the court to be

7

approved, as far as numbers, then it is our responsibility to

8

object to the same.

9

ones that we've had before, and are more specifically set out

10

The objections are very similar to the

in our memorandum.

11

The first issue is that under a bad faith defense,

12

under the - well, even before that, under the American Rule,

13

the general American Rule, attorneys' fees are awarded when

14

they're authorized by either statute or by contract in the

15

parties.

16

statute here is, that is being identified by the plaintiffs

17

is the Bad Faith Statute which says that "if a claim or a

18

defense is asserted without merit and in bad faith then

19

reasonable attorneys' fees can be awarded."

20

statute, we believe that is inapplicable here and the reason

21

is is because really this case had two different claims.

22

We don't have a contract between the parties.

The

We, under that

The first claim was for actual damages incurred by

23

the Gallegoses because of the encroachment on the property.

24

From the very beginning there was no contest as to the

25

encroachment.

As soon as we discovered the encroachment was
10

1

there, there were probably not even a $1,000 of damages which

2

had been incurred by that time.

3

contest as to how much should be awarded to those damages.

After that point it was a

4

As you remember in the trial brief when the damages

5

were finally liquidated, the plaintiffs were asking somewhere

6

around $127,000.

7

defended that action based on each of those discreet elements

8

of damage and the Court was persuaded, at least, in some of

9

those such that when the judgment was rendered it was at

In fact, the Lloyds strongly and vigorously

10

$72,000 - about 56 percent of the amount claimed.

11

that shows that, at least, as far as the elements of damage

12

and the amount of damage that the defense was not assertive

13

without merit, but was asserted with merit, and was necessary

14

for the trial to go forward as being defended.

15

We believe

The second part of that was the claim for punitive

16

damages which was brought, as the Court may remember, several

17

weeks before trial and was contested by the Lloyds, but we

18

did go forward and the plaintiffs spent considerable amount

19

of time eliciting evidence at trial as to the intent of the

20

parties in the, in causing the encumbrance, the Court's

21

specific findings, and we've gone back and reviewed the

22

Court's findings, and the Court said the Court fails to find

23

by a, oh, I can't remember-

24

THE COURT: Clear and convincing.

25

MR. DAVIS: Clear and convincing, I'm sorry, the
11

1

clear and convincing evidence that the Lloyds were guilty of

2

wanton or willful disregard of the rights of the Gallegoses

3

and that was a specific finding.

4

Therefore, the Lloyds were successful in defending

5

that action.

6

successful in all of the one claim and significant in part on

7

the other claim, the wrongful defense statute just doesn't

8

stand.

9

bad faith that was being contested, when there is an issue

10

for the bad faith attorney's fees is not in the conduct of

11

the parties prior to the litigation, but it's in the conduct

12

of the parties and their attorneys during the time of

13

litigation.

14

can hand to the Court if the Court would like to look at

15

them.

16

Utah Supreme Court statute that says exactly that, that's the

17

bad faith that we look at under the Bad Faith Statute.

18

I believe because of the fact that we were

It doesn't work in this matter.

Besides that, the

And I did bring a couple of cases with me that I

One of them is Tenth Circuit case and the other is a

The second prong of the assertion for the award of

19

attorney's fees is the one which the Court specifically

20

stated in the findings and fact, and that was - that it would

21

be a consequential damage caused by the encumbrance or the

22

trespass of the Lloyds on the Gallegos' property.

23

- that is a new principle that we could not find nor could

24

the Gallegoses find support for in the law so far in the

25

State of Utah.

It is not a majority position.

This is a

If the Court
12

1

goes that way, it will be making new law.

2

and in the case which was cited by both parties in the famous

3

footnote where the Court - Utah State Court says that, the

4

Supreme Court says that "we don't make this decision, but we

5

do note that we have allowed consequential damages on, at

6

least, two other situations." And those situations, one had

7

to do with an employment case and the other one had to do

8

with...

9
10

There have been

THE COURT: It was an insurance case.
MR. DAVIS: An insurance case, that's correct, where

11

they had to go out and incur significant fees.

12

the, in the interest of fair disclosure, Your Honor, I did

13

make another exhaustive research to see if there was any

14

other times when the Court could exert its equitable powers

15

to award attorney's fees, and I found two other instances

16

where the Court has such a power.

17

I also on

One is before the Public Service Commission.

There

18

is a Utah State Supreme Court case where the Court says,

19

"You, plaintiff, have incurred these attorney's fees that not

20

only benefit your client but a whole class of people,

21

therefore, we're going to award attorney's fees against the

22

regulated industry in favor of you."

23

And the other one was in the distribution of a

24

trust estate where one of the beneficiaries brought the

25

action which benefitted all of the other defendants - the
13

1

beneficiaries, some of which were antagonistic to the lawsuit

2

and the Court said, "in the interest of equity, we should

3

have all of the attorneys' fees, or the attorneys' fees,

4

shared by all the beneficiaries." I have not found, anywhere,

5

where a tort action has been able to been the basis for an

6

award of attorney's fees as consequential damages.

7

The one issue that I did see as far as the contract

8

is concerned, is if - and there was an insurance, there was a

9

construction contract where the attorney's fees were awarded,

10

but not in the litigation.

11

happened on the outside, for instance, if, in clearing off

12

liens which had come against the property prior to or

13

concurrently with the lawsuit against the contractor.

14

being said, what that would really mean is if the Gallegoses

15

were required to obtain legal assistance or other

16

professional assistance, not in the context of this lawsuit

17

but in the other context in remedying the problem

18

(inaudible), those fees or costs would be appropriately

19

assessed against the Lloyds as consequential damages, but not

20

the litigation expenses in this piece of litigation.

21

It was in the litigation that

That

The last part of the argument goes to the Bill of

22

Cost.

23

because that was like throwing chairs off of the Titanic.

24

But, if we do not have, the-

25 J

I did not particularize my objections to the cost

THE COURT: I think the metaphor is straightening
14

1

the chairs on the Titanic.

2

MR. DAVIS: Straightening the chairs off the, I

3

appreciate that - straightening the chairs.

But the issue is

4

is if the attorney's fees, and if Mr. Hunt's request for all

5

the attorney's fees and all the costs are awarded, then it

6

doesn't make any difference.

7

really looking at a Bill of Costs, and the Bill of Costs

8

under the Frampton

9

yes, deposition costs and fees, if the depositions helped

If it doesn't, then we're

case in the State of Utah it says that,

10

defer the case, should be awarded, and we agree to that.

11

Also, costs that are to the Court or for service of process.

12

But for $2,700 of copying charges and fax charges for expert

13

witness fees, which were specifically stricken, in the

14

Frampton

15

against the losing party in a lawsuit.

16

which should be awarded for - to the Court or for witnesses

17

for the statutory amounts.

18

case, those are not appropriate costs to be awarded

THE COURT: All right.

Only those costs

So, if you do not prevail on

19

your first two points, how much of the cost bill do you

20

object to?

21

. MR. DAVIS: We object to $8,805.08.

Those would be

22

$2,796 of copy charges; a title report of $600; appraisal of

23

$350; $500 rock, a rock wall estimate, mediation fee of $731;

24

of $3,827 of the expert witness.

25

appropriate charges or costs under the rule to be assessed

I don't believe those were

15

1
2

against my client.
THE COURT: All right.

Thank you.

Let me hear from

3

Mr. Hunt and I may have some questions.

4

Go ahead, Mr. Hunt.

5

MR. DAVIS: Thank you, Judge.

6

MR. HUNT: Thank you, Your Honor.

7

thing that's at issue here today is the amount of the

8

attorney's fees and costs.

Entitlement was ruled upon by the

9

Court at the end of trial.

Findings of fact and a judgment

I think the only

10

were entered on July 19th, awarding of fees and making

11

findings supporting that award, leaving only open the amount

12

of the fees to be addressed by motion.

13

motion filed to alter or amend those findings of fact or to

14

attack the judgment, or to attack the finding of entitlement.

15

Furthermore, there was no timely objection filed to

There was no Rule 59

16

the memorandum of costs and disbursement.

Under Rule 54, you

17

have five days to file an objection to the costs.

18

objection was timely filed. So, they waived their right to

19

challenge either the entitlement or the costs and really the

20

only issue that should be properly before the Court here is

21

the amount of the fees, and they have not filed a contrary

22

affidavit challenging the amount of the fees that we've

23

placed before the Court.

24

counsel now trying to attack both the entitlement issue as to

25

the fees and the entitlement issue to the costs where the

No such

So we find ourselves here with

16

1

time for doing so has already passed.

2

Now, that having been said, I think it's really

3

important because the findings that are in the case have been

4

entered by the Court and are essentially final, make some

5

very specific factual findings that clearly provide the

6

support for a 78-57-56 attorney's fee finding.

7

Finding 15, the Court says, "There were several physical

8

markers required by the Lot 106 site plan which never

9

materialized during the construction of the Lloyd's home.

For example,

10

These markers included the presence of a 12- to 14-foot high

11

embankment on the west side of the home, presence of two

12

large retaining walls on both the west and east side of the

13

driveway, and an average grade of the driveway of 8.5 percent

14

with a maximum grade of 10 percent.

15

markers provided unmistakable notice to the Lloyds that there

16

home was being constructed in the wrong location."

17

The absence of these

And then in finding of fact Number 29, the Court

18

finds, "As a direct consequence of the actions and/or

19

omissions of the Lloyds, the Gallegos were required to obtain

20

counsel and pursue this action in order to resolve the

21

boundary encroachment, adjust the lot boundaries, and render

22

Lot 102 useable and marketable.

23

action to address or resolve the trespass.

24

Lloyds failed to act in good faith in their defense of this

25 J action.

The Lloyds initiated no
In addition, the

And particularly, the Lloyds lacked an honest belief
17

1

in the propriety of their actions and ultimately took

2

advantage of plaintiffs' property rights of which they knew

3

or should have known.

4

goes without merit.

5

fees incurred should be established by motion pursuant to

6

Rule 73, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure."

7

Their defense to the Gallegos' claims

The amount of the plaintiffs' attorney's

So, it seems to me that the defendants find

8

themselves in a situation where they failed to challenge

9

findings of fact and conclusions of law that have been

10

entered by the Court pursuant to the rules, which require

11

Rule 59 motion within ten days of entering the judgment.

12

They didn't do that.

13

seeking the establishment of the amount of our fees and then

14

they try to challenge both entitlement as to fees and costs

15

and, of course, the time to do either of those has already

16

passed.

17

under the circumstances of this case, what we're asking for

18

is proper.

19

prepare exhibits for the expert testimony that was necessary

20

in order to determine how to resolve the boundary

21

encroachment problem and finally, the deposition costs that

22

were used in cross-examining the witness, which, although

23

they weren't allowed in the Frampton

24

are within the discretion of the trial court to grant.

25

Instead, they waited until we file

And even if it hadn't, Your Honor, we believe that

The cost that he's questioning were costs to

case, deposition costs

So, our position is (a) that they've waived the
18

1

right to challenge entitlement to either the fees or costs,

2

either the award of attorney's fees or costs, and (b) there

3

is no evidence before the Court regarding the amount except

4

my affidavit and so it stands unchallenged as well.

5

And finally, I'd like to remark on this, two

6

things.

One is that at the end of the trial, the Court

7

stated on the record that it was about that far from awarding

8

the punitive damages and it was quite upset at how the

9

evidence had come in and the obvious fact that the Lloyds had

10

ignored and gone ahead with, essentially, intentionally and

11

built their house on someone else's property.

12

And secondly, is that in the judgment which was

13

entered on July 19th, the Court ordered the Lloyds to

14

forthwith proceed to resolve the boundary issue - and they

15

haven't done it.

16

county to amend the plat to fix the judgment and no petition

17

before the homeowners' association to get that approved and

18

so we're now at five, four or five months, down the road, and

19

it's the same pattern that was observed prior to trial where

20

the Lloyds have got their pound of flesh and they're just

21

sitting on it and my clients are sitting there with an

22

unmarketable lot, so we've got that problem as well.

23

you, Your Honor.

24
25

They haven't - there's no filings with the

Thank

THE COURT: Well, let me ask you a,couple questions,
Mr. Hunt.
19

1

MR. HUNT: Sure.

2

THE COURT: Mr. Davis argues that the court's

3

references in the past, not this Court but the Supreme Court,

4

the awarding damages under the statute, you have to

5

demonstrate that there was a lacking and an honest belief in

6

the propriety of the actions and/or activities in question.

7

And Mr. Davis says that those activities in question have to

8

come after the filing of the lawsuit and that's where the bad

9

faith has to be present in order to get damages.

10
11

Comment on

that for me, would you?
MR. HUNT: Well, I'm not - I'm not familiar with the

12

case he's talking about.

13

that during the conduct of a trial, if a witness testifies in

14

such a fashion that their testimony is utterly incredible,

15

which the Court found Mr. Lloyd's testimony to be, that is,

16

in effect, bad faith.

17

to the defense because you're essentially trying to lie in

18

order to defend your case.

19

case that we've quoted to the Court, the court specifically

20

found that that was sufficient to support a finding of

21

attorney's fees under the statute because-

22

The research that we did indicated

That's a lack - that's a lack of merit

And so, in the Katie

vs.

Johnson

THE COURT: So you assert, regardless of how

23

reprehensible their conduct was before the lawsuit, the fact

24

that he comes into court and makes statements which are

25

incredible in court, constitutes bad faith sufficient to form
20

1

the basis of -

2

MR. HUNT: Exactly, but that theirs - that's exactly

3

the Katie

4

mean, the Court found that that evidence to not only a

5

defense without merit, but a lack of good faith, and lack of

6

good faith is equated with bad faith, and they found that

7

that would support a finding for attorney's fees under the

8

statute.

9

vs.

Johnson

case that I quoted in my brief.

I

THE COURT: Well, Mr. Davis says, "Well, they never

10

really objected to the motion that their property was in

11

trespass and, therefore, how can they possibly be in bad

12

faith here?"

13

MR. HUNT: Well, I don't know what he means by

14

"they've never objected that their property was in trespass".

15

We had to try this case in order to resolve it.

16

through a court ordered arbitration, I mean a mediation

17

proceeding and they simply refused to recognize that they had

18

caused the damage to the plaintiffs that they, in fact,

19

caused and we had to take this thing all the way through a

20

trial, and it was a contested trial. And so-

21

We went

THE COURT: Well, but with that he says that "you

22

were trying to get 127, Court only awarded the 72", so, you

23

know, their defense, obviously, is, at least, in part,

24

meritorious. Comment on that aspect of it.

25

MR. HUNT: Well, I suppose there's a range - there
21

1

was a range of damage evidence and the Court found within

2

that range of damage evidence, ours was high, theirs was low,

3

and the Court came down somewhere in the middle.

4

so with respect to the damages, perhaps, one could say.

5

for them to say they admitted the trespass and then for Mr.

6

Lloyd to get on the stand and testify under oath repeatedly

7

that he didn't know his house was located in the wrong place

8

and that he'd lived there for eight years and it wasn't until

9

we sued him that he discovered that his house was not built

But - and

10

where it was located, he was lying.

11

mean, you couldn't be a senescent

12

conclusion, and with all the physical markers that were so

13

obvious to everybody in the courtroom and whatnot, and his

14

own architect even refused to support him and sort of threw

15

him under the bus during the testimony and distanced himself

16

from the entire process.

17

standpoint in terms of a finding of bad faith, his approach

18

to the case is his denial in effect, perhaps, not in his

19

pleadings, but his denial and unwillingness to come forward

20

and do something about this problem that he created.

21

It was incredible.

But

human being and reach that

And so, you know, from our

THE COURT: Tell me what you think the burden of

22

proof is to show this bad faith.

23

evidence or is it something higher than that?

24

I

Is it preponderance of the

MR. HUNT: I don't know that the court has ever - I

25 I haven't found a burden in the statute, quite honestly.
22

1
2

THE COURT: So you're not aware of any higher burden
other than preponderance?

3

MR, HUNT: Not that I'm aware of - not for the

4

statutory findings.

5

finding or a fraud finding, then I think that's correct.

6

those are because, really you're asking the court to-

7

Certainly, if it was a punitive damage
But

THE COURT: So we could be in a situation where the

8

Court determines that there's not clear and convincing

9

evidence of - to justify punitive damages, but that there is

10

a preponderance of the evidence that would indicate bad faith

11

conduct?

12

MR. HUNT: Oh, absolutely.

And I think the

13

statutory, the statutory standard for bad faith attorney's

14

fees under 78-27-56 is lower than the standard for punitive

15

damages.

16

egregiousness is...

17

I think the showing both by burden and by

THE COURT: So if the Court indicated as it did,

18

that he came very close to finding punitive damages, but not

19

quite, it's not much of a stretch then to conclude that there

20

was sufficient evidence, preponderance of the evidence, to

21

establish bad faith?

22

MR. HUNT: Well, I thought the Court's finding was

23

actually quite consistent with what his statements were

24

regarding the punitive damage claim because, I mean, it was

25

a, from my standpoint, looking at the evidence, I thought it
23

1

was very, it was a pretty egregious case and that's why I

2

moved to amend the, add the punitive claim near the end of

3

the case after we had the discovery done because I'm looking

4

at this and I'm going, "Wow", you know, "There are a lot of

5

things here that are very, very difficult to ignore."

6

So, and I think that - I think really the best case to

7

illustrate the point that the Court just mentioned is the

8

Katie

9

that for purposes of this statute, the absence of good faith

vs.

Johnson

case where the court actually said in there

10

is the equivalent of bad faith.

11

different than what you would have to show in a punitive

12

case.

13

a statutory purposes, the Court stating what you have to show

14

are the two elements that Mr. Davis mentioned, and I think

15

we've shown them. I think the Court's findings that already

16

are of record in this case support the award of attorney's

17

fees.

18

And, of course, that's

I mean, it's a lower standard, and so I think that for

THE COURT: All right. Talk about the consequential

19

damages issue and whether consequential damages ought to be

20

awarded in an intentional tort situation involving, or in a

21

trespass situation which involves intentional conduct on the

22

part of one of the defendants.

23
24

MR. HUNT: Well, I don't want to mislead the Court
on this because I think that footnote in the Billings

case

25 J accurately sets forth the current state of the law in Utah on
24

1

that, and it, with respect to whether or not, in the, in an

2

intentional tort case the court would extend that

3

consequential damage rule to the award of fees, I think is an

4

open question.

5

Court case, but I've seen it done, for example, in a breach

6

of warranty deed situation, where you, you know, you give

7

someone a warranty deed and then you breach it and the

8

attorney's fees are often awarded as a consequential damage

9

of a breach of the warranty and a deed, but, again, that's

I've seen it done.

I couldn't find a Supreme

10

more of a, that's kind of a quasi-contractual type case

11

rather than a tort case.

12

open question right now in Utah as to whether you could do

13

that, but - and that's why, I think, you know, when the Court

14

was ruling I also raised the 78-28-56 issue because I felt

15

that in just viewing the evidence and given the Court's

16

comments about how close the Court came to awarding

17

punitives, that there was certainly enough evidence of bad

18

faith to support an award under the statute, and so I think

19

that clearly would support the Court's finding.

20

But, I mean, so I think it's an

THE COURT: Well, just to make it clear, the Court

21

found that the basis for awarding fees was alternative, in

22

other words-

23

MR. HUNT: Correct.

24

THE COURT: - either and/or.

25

So in a situation

where we have the facts in this case, you feel that it is
25

1

foreseeable that the plaintiffs in this case would have to be

2

incurring legal costs given the conduct of Mr. Lloyd and what

3

he did?

4

the Gallegoses would have to incur legal costs in order to

5

resolve this problem?

6

Is it your assertion that he should of foreseen that

MR. HUNT: Certainly, at some point along the line,

7

I think he did.

I think if he had been really pro-active and

8

upon immediately discovering the, and I'm put "discovering"

9

in quotes, the trespass, if he had been very pro-active and

10

taking affirmative steps to resolve the boundary issue,

11

tender and offer of a reasonable payment for their costs and

12

damages and what-not, he could have mitigated this seriously.

13

There was no evidence of mitigation - zero, none.

14

basically, he sat on his hands until the Court entered a

15

judgment, and now he's still sitting on his hands. And I

16

think that's, you know, the light has to come on at some

17

point and I think that's a fact in this case that is really

18

disturbing to my clients, I know, because they're - they've

19

felt like what has happened here is their property has been

20

taken and then they've had to incur the expense and effort

21

and time to solve a problem that somebody else caused, and

22

it's been a very expensive endeavor for them.

23
24

I mean,

And so I think that clearly, when you create a
legal problem like this, because or when you trespass on,

25 J build a permanent structure on someone else's property, it
26

1

becomes a legal problem that the legal system sort of has to

2

solve because you've mucked up the boundaries and whatnot of

3

their property and you've got an encroachment.

4

marketability problems and it's going to take the

5

intervention of, at the very least, counsel and some

6

cooperative effort and, perhaps, in this case, the approval

7

of the county council in order to solve the boundary problem,

8

and at the worst, it involves the court to come in and force

9

the issue, and that's where we find ourselves here, is we've

Now we've got

10

had to ultimately resort to this Court for redress of this

11

grievance because of the inactivity and lack of pro-active

12

behavior on the part of plaintiff, even after he admits

13

discovering the trespass.

14

THE COURT: And you're saying it's on-going now?

15

MR. HUNT: Yeah, God, I mean, we still can't sell

16

the lot because the boundary's mucked up, and so we've got to

17

get that fixed so that Joan and Andy can sell the lot and get

18

on with their business.

19

THE COURT: All right.

20

MR. HUNT: Thank you, Your Honor.

21

MR. DAVIS: Your Honor, may I just address the

22
23

Thank you.

issue?
THE COURT: Well, I'm going to have you come up and

24

answer some questions here first, and I'll let you say

25

whatever else you'd like to say.
27

1

First of all, you assert that your client doesn't

2

deny that his construction was basically a trespass; is that

3

right?

4

MR. DAVIS: That's correct.

5

THE COURT: All right.

So - and I know that you

6

intend to appeal because you've already done it

7

[unintelligible] your appeal, but I'm curious as to why he

8

hasn't complied with the portion of the Court's order that

9

would help to mitigate the damages that are ongoing that the

10

Gallegoses are suffering?

11

MR. DAVIS: Within a week of the trial, we

12

immediately contacted Mr. Hoffman and had him draw a new

13

plat.

14

looked at it, told us he didn't like that, sent it back to

15

us.

16

over the last several weeks.

17

Well, we really like that way that we originally told us, do

18

that, so we're not getting, we've already talked to the

19

homeowners' association.

20

signed that can be approved and move that through.

21

recently as last week we talked again, Mr. Hoffman, say "Get

22

us a plat that then has approval signatures so we can take

23

it." We have not laid on it. We've been having - and that

24

first diagram was ordered within a week of after we were here

I passed that on to George, or to Mr. Hunt.

Mr. Hunt

We talked to him and we have had several communications
Recently, he's remarked to us,

We're getting a plat, about to be
As

25 J and it was within a couple of weeks that we sent it to
28

1

George.

So, it isn't true that we have done nothing.

2

have not scheduled the meeting yet with the homeowners'

3

Association.

4

earlier to say, "This is what we're going to do.

5

going to have a problem?

6

the plat so we can have it brought appropriately to the

7

group?"

8
9

We

We have talked to officers that we talked to
Are we

What size and shape would you like

We're not sitting back on our laurels or our
haunches.

We'd be happy to do this today.

There's no reason

10

we can't get it done.

11

our mind twice as far as which configuration we wanted.

12

But we were not the one that changed

THE COURT: Do you think that having your - one of

13

your defendants testify at trial where his testimony is found

14

by the Court to be incredible, whether that constitutes a bad

15

faith defense in a case?

16

MR. DAVIS: I don't think so.

I think, and I'm just

17

guessing here, Your Honor, but I think in most of your trials

18

you will find some of the testimony incredible.

19

match, the two different testimonies don't match - somebody

20

is wrong.

21

or they're not telling you what the truth is.

22

of Mr. Lloyd has not deviated one bit from the start.

They don't

Somebody's not, either not remembering correctly
The testimony

23

The Court may have found it incredible.

I'm not

24

here to testify or to be a character witness, but Mr. Lloyd

25

strongly asserts and continues to assert that notwithstanding
29

1

those diagrams, he did not know, nor did his wife know, nor

2

did anybody have an inkling that he was on the Gallegos'

3

property until the Gallegoses came to their door and showed

4

them a survey.

5

his surveyor to come out and redo it or relook at it.

6

that was not contested.

7

And at that point they immediately said, "Can we go ahead and

8

work this through?"

9

^No, we're already talking to our attorney.

And immediately, what did he do?

He called
And

He did come out and they said yes.

And at that point, the Gallegoses said,
We'll go from

10

there."

11

was discovered and the time this lawsuit was filed.

12

thought we would settle it. This was a matter of weeks, not

13

years.

14

This was not a long period of time from the time it
We

THE COURT: Do you think there's a difference

15

between the bad faith defense on liability issues versus a

16

bad faith defense on damage issues?

17

MR. DAVIS: I don't see that anywhere.

18

THE COURT: Do you think that he defended the

19

I see that-

liability on the punitive damage issue?

20

MR. DAVIS: Yes.

21

THE COURT: And do you feel that his defense of that

22

was in good faith?

23

MR. DAVIS: Yes.

24

THE COURT: All right.

25

And even though the Court

found that his testimony was incredible on that - on those
30

1

issues?

2

MR. DAVIS: When you asked me how I feel, you're

3

asking a subjective issue.

As counsel and as a clerk of the

4

court, I believed his defense was in good faith.

5

THE COURT: All right.

6

MR. DAVIS: I agree with Mr. Hunt that there is a

7

difference in the standard of, the standard of proof which is

8

required, the clear and convincing for the punitive damage,

9

and apparently, cause I see nothing to the contrary, just

10

preponderance of evidence for the statutory attorney's fees.

11

THE COURT: So, it's possible that the claims for

12

punitive damages may not rise to that level, but may rise to

13

the level of bad faith?

14

MR. DAVIS: I think so.

But if you do go to the

15

level of bad faith under the statutory damage, it isn't just

16

that it is being asserted in bad faith.

17

assertion which is without merit.

18

and even if the Court finds that a portion of the assertions

19

were without merit, the Court shouldn't be able to award all

20

of the damages, all of the attorney's fees under that because

21

a significant portion of that had nothing to do with the bad

22

faith.

23

It has to be an

Now, if that's the case,

THE COURT: But, again, we have a crossover issue of

24

whether the bad faith has to be on all parts of the case,

25

namely, liability and damages versus liability as opposed to
31

1

damages.

2

Tell me, it seems to me that lacking an honest

3

belief and the propriety of the actions or activities in

4

question, that appears to me to be a different standard than

5

what you' re articulating here with respect to the merits, and

6

I'm wondering what case you cite with respect to the standard

7

that you've just-

8
9

MR. DAVIS: Can I give a copy of this case to the
Court?

10

THE COURT: Sure.

11

MR. DAVIS: This is a Tenth Circuit case, Your

12

Honor. (Inaudible) marked up, if that's all right.

13

marked, (inaudible).

And I've

14

THE COURT: Well-

15

MR. DAVIS: -starting where it says-

16

THE COURT: Yeah, I guess this doesn't really answer

17

my question.

18

MR. DAVIS: Okay.

19

THE COURT: And it seems to me that the Utah rule is

20

lacking an honest belief in the propriety of the activities

21

in question.

22

right in front of me at this point, but that may even be the

23

statutory language, what's the code section?

And I don't know - I don't have the statute

24

MR. HUNT: 78-27-56.

25

MR. DAVIS: That is not the court language though, I
32

1

don't believe that.

2

THE COURT:

"In civil actions the court shall award

3

reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court

4

determines that the action or defense to the action was

5

without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith

6

except under subsection 2.

7

"The court in its discretion may award," this is 2,

8

"The Court in its discretion may award no fees or limited

9

fees against the party under subsection 1 but only if the

10

court finds that the party has filed an affidavit of

11

impecuniousity, or B, the court enters in the record the

12

reason for not awarding."

13

don't think.

14

Okay.

So, that's not relevant here I

Well, let me ask a further question and that

15

is you've heard Mr. Hunt's Rule 59 argument.

16

that.

17

Respond to

MR. DAVIS: Rule 59 is there so we can make a motion

18

for a new trial.

19

This is - we believe this is an issue of law.

20

an issue of fact.

21

We don't believe a new trial is required.
It isn't even

THE COURT: Doesn't 59(e) say that you have the

22

right to file a motion to amend a judgment, and isn't that

23

what you're asking the Court to do, alter or amend the

24

judgment?

25

MR. DAVIS: That may be in sum and substance what
33

1
2

we're asking, but we'reTHE COURT: When does the clock start to run?

When

3

the final period is put on the attorney's fees award or some

4

time before that?

5

MR. DAVIS: For the Rule 59 motion?

6

THE COURT: Yeah.

7

MR. DAVIS: It's probably at the, I don't know off

8
9
10

the top of my head, I'm sorry.
THE COURT: All right.

Okay.

Anything further that

you would like to respond to?

11

MR. DAVIS: I would apologize if I have been a day

12

or two late on making objection because there should not be

13

any prejudice from what we did.

14

with what needed to happen because the rule also says that

15

the attorneys will be presenting their objection to that, so

16

that's when we made our objection.

17

wasted the Court's time or counsel's time.

18

would be the appropriate time to get it before the Court and

19

we worked hard to get the findings of fact.

20

easy findings of fact to try and put together, and counsel's

21

- counsel and I spend significant of time, amount of time to

22

try and work those out.

23

and asked us to try and work well together and not come back

24

to the court.

We thought we were complying

And I apologize if I have
We thought this

This was not an

And the Court asked us to do that

So, we specifically listened to the Court's

25 I findings and tried to stay as absolutely true to them as we
34
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